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Abstract
This paper investigates the performance, persistence, and business cycle asym-
metries in active Norwegian mutual funds using a dataset free of survivorship bias
between 1983 and 2014. Fund performance is evaluated using both unconditional
and conditional versions of Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. To determine the
statistical significance of our result, we adopt a cross-sectional bootstrap methodol-
ogy. We find that actively managed Norwegian mutual funds on aggregate produce
returns that underperform the four-factor benchmark net of costs. When we ex-
amine individual funds, our bootstrap simulations provide no evidence of skilled
fund managers in the right tail of the cross-sectional performance distribution, but
several inferior performing fund managers in the left tail. Tests for persistence in
performance provide no evidence of risk-adjusted performance persistence among
previous winners, but short-term persistence among previous losers. Additionally,
we perform a series of non-parametric two-period tests that allow us to infer whether
some funds perform consistently better or worse compared to other funds in the
sample. These tests reveal evidence of short-term performance persistence among
both recent winners and losers. Moreover, we use two different methodologies to
explicitly link fund performance to recessionary and non-recessionary states in the
Norwegian business cycle. We find weak evidence of asymmetric performance of
actively managed Norwegian mutual funds.
∗Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), NO-5045 Bergen, Norway. We would like to thank our
supervisor Torfinn Harding for his guidance and feedback which is much appreciated. Additionally, we
gratefully acknlowedge the Oslo Stock Exchange Information Services, the Norwegian Fund and Asset
Management Association and Bernt A. Ødegaard for their help in providing us with the data necessary
for the completeness of our research. Main programmes in this study use MATLAB®. Codes are available
from the authors upon request.
1 Introduction
There are two key issues on mutual fund performance that have been subject for academic
debates over the years. The first issue concerns whether active mutual funds are able to
add value by generating risk-adjusted returns net of costs. According to the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis (EMH) brought forward by Fama (1970), any attempts to outperform the
market is essentially a game of chance rather than skill, as current prices should reflect
all available information. Still, active fund managers try to add value by attempting to
“beat” the market by exploiting temporary mispricing. Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980)
equilibrium model states the markets cannot be fully efficient all the time; thus, there
is reason to believe that skilled fund managers are able to exploit periods in time where
mispricing in the market occur. However, most previous studies document significant un-
derperformance of actively managed mutual funds and argue that active fund managers do
little besides collect fees (See e.g. Jensen, 1968; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989b; Elton et al.,
1995; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Edelen, 1999). So why do investors buy
actively managed mutual funds when empirical evidence suggest no superior managerial
skill? The reasons remain a puzzle.
The second issue concerns whether it is possible to identify abnormal performance
ex-ante, and for how long it persists. Persistence in performance is interesting from both
an academic and practical point of view. From an academic point of view, evidence of
persistence in performance would support a rejection of the semi-strong form of the EHM.
The practical implication is that evidence of persistence could allow investors to earn risk-
adjusted returns by exploiting past performance. There have been some discrepancies
regarding the presence of persistence in mutual fund returns in previous literature. The
majority of recent studies suggests that identifying funds with superior future performance
is a difficult task, unless portfolio rebalancing is frequent and the performance is evaluated
over short time horizons (See e.g. Hendricks et al., 1993; Brown and Goetzmann, 1995;
Carhart, 1997; Bollen and Busse, 2005).
Motivated by the discussion of asymmetries in light of changing economic circum-
stances on mutual fund performance, Kosowski (2011) explicitly investigates the perfor-
mance of US mutual funds in recession and non-recession periods. Kosowski (2011) argue
that mutual fund investors may be willing to trade off some overall performance for supe-
rior performance in bad states of the economy when the marginal utility of wealth is high.
Thus, he aims to provide an answer to the puzzle why investors keep investing in actively
managed mutual funds despite the documented underperformance. Previous literature on
asset pricing suggests that investors are more willing to pay premiums for assets whose
returns are negatively correlated with consumption. When we have economic contractions
in the business cycle (i.e. recessions), consumption tends to be particularly low (See e.g.
Breeden, 1979; Rubinstein, 1976; Grossman and Shiller, 1981).
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1These implications give rise to a third issue on mutual fund performance, concerning
whether active fund managers are able to add value for investors during recessionary
states in the economy when consumption tends to be low, and the marginal utility of
wealth is high. Up to this date, research on this issue has been quite sparse.
Given the practical importance to the average investor, Norwegian mutual funds have
received little consideration, which makes Norwegian mutual funds truly a subject of
interest. To our knowledge, there exist only a handful studies that have conducted com-
prehensive research on Norwegian mutual funds. The paper closest to ours is Sørensen
(2009a) who examine all Norwegian equity mutual funds from 1982 to 2008.1 Sørensen
(2009a) find no significant evidence of superior performance at the aggregate level. His
bootstrap simulations document virtually no evidence of superior performance at the indi-
vidual fund level but provide evidence of inferior performing funds. Furthermore, Sørensen
(2009a) find no evidence of performance persistence amongst either winner or loser funds.
Although his results are in line with the theoretical concepts in finance theory, Sørensen
(2009a) do not shed light on the third issue that is, whether mutual funds perform well
in bad states of the economy when it matter the most for investors.
The purpose of this paper is threefold. The paper investigates the performance and
persistence in actively managed Norwegian mutual fund returns. Additionally, the paper
aims to answer a hitherto unanswered question regarding how active Norwegian fund
managers perform in state of recessions when it matters the most to investors. Specifically,
we aim to answer the following questions to ensure a thorough evaluation: 1) Do managers
of active Norwegian funds generate risk-adjusted returns (i.e. alpha) net of costs, and if
so, is the performance attributable to skill or luck? and 2) Does performance persist
among extreme winners and extreme loser funds? and 3) Do actively managed Norwegian
mutual funds deliver alpha in the state of recessions when performance matters the most
to investors?
To address these issues, we use a dataset free of survivorship bias comprising 98 actively
managed domestic equity mutual funds with monthly net returns from January 1983 to
December 2014. We apply both unconditional and conditional versions of the four-factor
model of Carhart (1997) to examine the existence of superior and inferior fund managers.
To ensure proper statistical inference of our results, we adopt a bootstrap methodology
similar to Kosowski et al. (2006), Cuthbertson et al. (2008) and Fama and French (2010).
In addition to account for complex distributional properties, the bootstrap allows us
to separate skill from luck in individual mutual fund performance. To investigate the
existence of persistence in performance we adapt some of the most prominent statistical
tests proposed in the literature. Specifically, we employ a recursive portfolio formation
approach to examine the existence of risk-adjusted performance persistence. Additionally,
1Sørensen (2009a) wrote his paper as a part of his doctoral dissertation at The Norwegian School of
Economics. He applies a bootstrap methodology similar to ours in his study.
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1we perform a series of non-parametric two-period tests to assess whether there are funds
in our sample that consistently perform better compared to other funds in our sample.
To answer the question on how fund managers perform in recessions, we apply two dif-
ferent methodologies. First, we explicitly examine aggregate fund performance in different
states of the business cycle using a binary classification of recessions and non-recession
periods in the Norwegian economy. Specifically, we construct separate sub-samples of
recession and non-recession periods in the Norwegian economy based on Aastveit et al.
(2014) classification of recession dates in Norway. Second, following Kosowski (2011),
we apply a novel conditional performance measurement methodology based on a Markov
regime-switching model where we let the data determine the indicator of the recession
and non-recessionary state. The main advantage of this model is that it allows for the
involvement of multiple equations in a system that characterizes time-series behaviors in
different states, and is permitting switching between these equations. This enables the
model to capture more complex dynamic patterns. The switching mechanism between the
equations (or states) is controlled by an unobservable state (latent-state) variable that is
assumed to follow a first-order Markov chain.
We find that managers of active Norwegian mutual funds, on aggregate, do not have
sufficient skill to generate risk-adjusted returns to cover the costs they are imposing on
investors. When we study individual funds, our bootstrap simulations suggest no evidence
of superior fund mangers. On the other hand, we find significantly negative risk-adjusted
performance in the left tail of the performance distribution, which cannot be explained
by random chance alone. Thus, our results indicate that there exist a large number of
inferior performing fund managers in the universe of Norwegian mutual funds. Moreover,
our recursive portfolio formation test reveals no evidence of dependable performance per-
sistence when adjusting for risk among top performing funds. This result implies that
investors cannot exploit past performance to earn positive risk-adjusted returns, a result
that coincides with the semi-strong form of the EHM. On the contrary, we find that per-
formance amongst loser funds strongly persists for short time horizons before it largely
disappears, a result in line with the major consensus in previous literature (See e.g. Berk
and Green, 2004; Bollen and Busse, 2005; Huij and Verbeek, 2007). Non-parametric two-
period tests reveal short-term persistence amongst extreme winners and extreme losers
relative to other funds in our sample.
Furthermore, our tests for asymmetric performance reveals that actively managed
Norwegian mutual funds, on aggregate, show some indications to perform better in re-
cession periods compared to non-recession periods. Specifically, from our Markov regime-
switching model, we find that the difference in alpha between recession and non-recession
periods is 1.89% per year. Differences in alpha estimates between recessions and non-
recession periods are robust to the binary classification of recession dates based on Aastveit
et al. (2014). Although statistical tests show evidence of asymmetries in the returns of
3
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actively managed Norwegian funds, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the alpha in re-
cession and non-recession periods is independently statistically significantly different from
zero.
Our paper makes two main contributions to the existing literature. First, it provides
the most comprehensive performance analysis on Norwegian mutual funds up to date,
covering almost the whole Norwegian mutual funds market’s period of existence. Second,
to our knowledge, it is the first paper to employ a regime-switching methodology to
calculate risk-adjusted performance measures during recessionary and non-recessionary
states in the Norwegian business cycle. Thus, our study provides answers to the question
whether Norwegian funds are able to add value for investors when it matters the most.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a litera-
ture review that covers important academic papers on topics similar to ours. Section 3
presents our dataset and considers various data properties and selection criteria. Section
4 presents empirical results on the performance of actively managed Norwegian mutual
funds, whereas Section 5 tests for persistence in the performance. Section 6 present em-
pirical evidence on Norwegian mutual fund performance in recession and non-recession
periods, and provides in-depth explanations of our implementation of a regime-switching
framework used to capture asymmetries in mutual fund returns. Section 7 provides con-
cluding remarks.
1.1 The Structure of Mutual Funds
A mutual fund is a collective investment vehicle that pools money from many investors to
purchase securities. It has separate legal entity and is owned by its unitholders, whereas an
investment company with concession manages the money in the fund. Fund management
companies are paid a fee for this service, which is usually a percentage of funds under
management, but it may also be linked to performance. The fund’s Net Asset Value
(NAV) is the price you have to pay to take part in this investor community. The investment
manager then adds your money into the same pot as the other investors, and the sum of all
these investments is called Assets Under Management (AUM). Based on investment goals
set by the fund management, the fund constructs a portfolio consisting of stocks, bonds,
short-term money-market instruments, other securities or assets, or some combination.
The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association (VFF2) classifies the division
of funds into four main types, and a variety of sub-groups. The point of division is to make
it easier to compare returns, risks and costs between comparable funds. The four main
categories are stock or equity funds, bond or fixed income funds, money market funds
and balanced funds. Equity funds invest most of the unitholder’s capital in the stock
market, which represent an ownership share (or equity) in the companies. Equity funds
2From here on referred to as VFF (Verdipapirfondenes Forening).
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are divided into different sub-groups, each depending on what kind of investment universe
the particular fund invests in. Stock or equity funds may invest primarily in Norwegian
securities (Domestic or Norwegian equity funds), in Nordic securities (Nordic funds), in
both Norwegian and foreign securities (Global funds), in foreign securities (International
funds) or in assets in the European equity market (EU and EFTA countries; European
funds), among others. These funds may also differ with respect to the share distribution
method used. In addition, the funds may focus only on specific industries or sectors.
Bond funds invest in long-term fixed income securities. Since it is a fixed income
fund, it has less volatility than equity funds and balanced funds. The major difference
between bond and money market funds is that bond funds have greater price risk, which
emerges as a result of changes in interest rates. Money market funds invest primarily in
short-term fixed income securities, i.e. securities that have a maturity of less than a year.
These funds are subject to strict requirements regarding liquidity and credit quality. This
means that the funds are only permitted to invest in securities that have been considered
to be of good quality by an analysis bureau. Balanced funds are funds that invest in a
combination of both equities and fixed income securities. For example, a balanced fund
may invest 50% of its total assets in equities and 50% in fixed income securities. This
allocation can vary across the many different balanced funds, and over time. Because of
the smaller proportion of stocks, the volatility is less, and it has lower fluctuations in the
value.
Norwegian equity mutual funds are funds whose investment mandate are to normally
have 80-100% exposure to domestic equities, and are regulated by “Verdipapirfondloven”
(LOV)3. Norwegian equity mutual funds are open-end, meaning that the shares in the
funds can be issued and redeemed at any given point of time. §6-6 in LOV states that a
mutual fund cannot allocate more than 5% of the assets to a single security. However, up
to 10% is allowed if the total sum of the allocations does not exceed 40% of the fund’s
total assets. Under certain regulations given by the Ministry of Finance, mutual funds are
allowed to use derivatives (§6-1), but shorting stocks or engage in the futures and option
markets is not permitted. The practical implication of this means that Norwegian mutual
funds must have a spread of at least 16 single securities in their portfolios. Moreover, the
four largest individual investments cannot exceed 40%, whereas the remaining 60% must
consist of minimum twelve single securities (since maximum allocation is 5%). Thus, the
potential ability to generate positive abnormal returns is rather limited due to the reduced
hedging opportunities. Moreover, Norwegian equity mutual funds are open-end, meaning
that the shares in the funds can be issued and redeemed at any given point of time.
3Norwegian mutual funds are also regulated by the European Union’s Undertakings for Collective
Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS). The directive (adopted in 1985) does not directly
regulate mutual funds in the European Union, but is implemented in “Verdipapirfondloven” (LOV).
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More importantly, Norwegian equity mutual funds can be passively or actively man-
aged. In active management, the fund manager pursues his own strategy and invests in
companies that he believes will provide the best returns in order to beat a given bench-
mark index. The different strategies involve e.g. future predictions about the market and
other fundamental analyses in the quest to beat the index. The costs of investing in an
active fund are therefore quite sizable because of the fees imposed for this service. In
passive management, the capital is invested to track a given benchmark index. Thus, the
cost of investing in passively managed funds is relatively low compared to that of actively
managed funds.
1.1.1 The Norwegian Mutual Fund Industry
Worldwide, there has been a remarkable increase in the mutual fund market. The Nor-
wegian mutual fund industry is still in an early phase in comparison to other more estab-
lished markets, but has grown quite rapidly throughout the years of existence. From 1982
to 2014 the total market value of Norwegian equity mutual funds increased from NOK
290 million to NOK 85 billion.4 Table I below reports some interesting features about
Norwegian equity mutual funds for the period 1994-2014.5
As can be observed from Column 1 in the table, the average number of customers
per fund each year is steadily decreasing from 1998 and throughout 2014. This coincides
with the last two columns of the table, which shows the development in Norwegian equity
funds as a percentage of the total equity fund market, and as percentage of the total
fund market. In 1994, 92% of the total equity fund market consisted of Norwegian equity
funds, whereas 37% was attributable to the total mutual fund market. At the end of
2014, the same numbers decreased to 20.9% and 10.2%, respectively. It may seem like
investors have gradually turned their investments towards global equity funds, and sought
the diversification benefits that funds with wider investment mandates provides. Figure
1 at the end of this section illustrates the development in asset allocations of Norwegian
mutual funds from 1994 to 2014 and puts this observation into perspective. From the
figure it becomes evident that the percentage of assets invested in Norwegian equity
mutual funds has decreased considerably. This decline has mainly been at the expense of
international equity funds, which possessed almost 40% of the total equity fund market
in 2014 and only 3% in 1994.
4Prior to 1982, there was only a single fund in existence at the Oslo Stock Exchange. Gjerde and
Sættem (1991) report a total market value of NOK 290 million at the end of 1982. VFF reports a total
market value of NOK 85 billion at the end of 2014.
5VFF did not report any data prior to 1994. We would like to thank Ida Aamodth-Hansen at VFF
for generously providing us with characteristics data on Norwegian mutual funds for the period between
1994 and 2014.
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Table I
Characteristics of the Norwegian Mutual Fund Market
This table reports characteristics for Norwegian equity mutual funds registered in Norway be-
tween 1994 and 2014. The data is collected from The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management
Association (VFF). Column 1 shows the average number of customers per fund each year,
whereas Column 2 refers to average assets under management. Column 3 reports average net
inflows. The last two columns refer to assets under management in percent of the total Norwe-
gian equity fund market, and in percent of the total Norwegian fund market. AUMs, inflows
and outflows are reported in million NOK.
Year Average Average Average % of total equity % of totalcustomers AUM net inflow fund market fund market
2014 4,138 1090 -25 20.9 10.2
2013 4,634 1087 -13 22.4 12.3
2012 5,745 945 -10 24.5 12.2
2011 6,017 833 -18 24.6 12.5
2010 6,281 1063 60 26.6 15.6
2009 6,874 822 -4 24.8 13.9
2008 6,571 359 -1 19.7 8.7
2007 6,726 746 -44 23.1 12.9
2006 6,175 635 16 24.5 14.8
2005 6,854 504 -61 26.2 14.0
2004 8,342 421 -52 31.8 16.8
2003 9,281 351 -1 35.9 17.3
2002 9,024 215 -11 37.1 15.8
2001 11,302 374 -11 37.0 20.7
2000 11,537 459 -23 38.3 24.6
1999 14,255 573 7 46.1 30.8
1998 15,878 403 4 67.3 38.4
1997 14,858 604 140 80.1 47.8
1996 13,354 422 99 86.1 41.4
1995 9,689 227 7 91.9 34.1
1994 10,987 235 8 92.0 37.0
From Column 2 in Table I, it can be seen that the average AUM grew significantly
from NOK 215 million in 2002 to NOK 746 million by the end of 2007. In 2008 the average
AUM decreased drastically to NOK 359 million, largely attributable to a sharp drop in
equity prices as a result of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The average AUM quickly
recovered to NOK 822 million at the end of 2009. Since 2009, the average AUM has
increased quite steadily with a minor drop in 2011. With NOK 1090 million in average
AUM by the end of year 2014, the compounded annual growth rate during the twenty-year
period has been 8%.
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Figure 1. Asset allocation of Norwegian mutual funds through time, 1994-2014.
The figure provides average asset allocations between five categories of Norwegian mutual funds,
namely equity, international equity, money market, and balanced funds. The x-axis presents the
respective years, whereas the y-axis presents the market share for each of the five categories.
The data from 1994 to 2014 is obtained from The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management
Association (VFF).
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2 Literature Review
In this section, we review previous studies on the performance, persistence, and time-
variability in mutual fund returns. First and foremost, we aim to establish expectations
to our findings by assessing the most important previous literature on subjects similar to
ours. The following sections are structured in the same manner as the remainder of this
thesis. That is, we first survey the most important literature on mutual fund performance.
Second, we survey the relevant literature on performance persistence in mutual funds.
Finally, we examine the literature on time-variability in mutual fund performance.
2.1 Mutual Fund Performance
Mutual fund performance is a widely researched topic within finance. First out was Jensen
(1968), who developed a single-factor model based on the earliest version of the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). In
the single-factor model of Jensen (1968), the intercept (alpha) represents the abnormal
performance of fund managers. The benchmark used to compute this measure is assumed
to be mean-variance efficient from the perspective of an uninformed investor. The percep-
tion is that an actively managed fund is expected to generate a positive alpha, whereas
a passive fund is expected to generate an alpha of zero. By using data of 115 US mutual
funds in the period 1945 - 1964, Jensen (1968) was the first to find solid evidence on the
performance of actively managed mutual funds. He concluded that US mutual funds were
on average not able to outperform a passive market proxy when accounting for manage-
ment fees. In an updated study, Ippolito (1989) find results that contradict with Jensen
(1968). Using a sample of US funds spanning over 20 years, Ippolito (1989) concludes
that U.S mutual funds are able to outperform the passive benchmark net of expenses.
More specifically, Ippolito (1989) find that 12 funds have significantly positive alphas net
of expenses, and that actively managed funds on average outperform the S&P500 by 88
basis points. In light of Jensen’s (1968) results, several research papers debate the use of
appropriate benchmarks when evaluating mutual fund performance (See e.g. Roll, 1978;
Lehmann and Modest, 1987; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989a; Connor and Korajczyk, 1991;
Sharpe, 1992; Elton et al., 1993; Pástor and Stambaugh, 2002b).
Roll (1978) criticizes the use of CAPM market proxies as performance benchmarks
since the model assumes that all investors have common beliefs and information, hence
that any measured abnormal performance can only occur when the market is inefficient.
Lehmann and Modest (1987) provide results on whether the choice of benchmarks affects
Jensen’s alpha. In particular, their empirical research shows how sensitive the choice of
arbitrage pricing theory benchmarks concerns Jensen’s (1968) measure. In particular,
Elton et al. (1993) argue that Ippolito’s (1989) positive alpha emerge as a result of inap-
propriate benchmarks.
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They find that the funds included in Ippolito’s sample invest heavily in small stocks that
are not included in the S&P500 benchmark used in the study. These stocks outperform
the S&P500 considerably during the sample period. When correcting for this, Elton
et al. (1995) concludes that the positive alpha found by Ippolito (1989) becomes negative.
Malkiel (1995) examine all diversified mutual funds between the period 1971 and 1999
each year and find that mutual funds underperform both net and gross of expenses. The
conclusion of Malkiel (1995), however, is also sensitive to the choice of benchmark. Over-
all, this led to the rise of extended multifactor models that controls for various anomalies
in the stock market. For instance, Fama and French (1993, 1996) establish a three-factor
model by extending the single-factor model of Jensen (1968) adding size (SMB) and
value (HML) factors in addition to the single market factor. Carhart (1997) extends the
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) further by including the one-year return
momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
In his study on mutual funds from 1985 to 1994, Gruber (1996) was among the first
to implement a multi-index model for mutual fund performance evaluation. His multi-
index model consists of four variables, namely excess market return, the difference in
return between a small cap and large cap portfolio, the difference in return between high
growth and a value portfolio, and excess return on a bond index. The model suggests that
mutual funds underperform an appropriately weighted average of the indices by about 65
basis points per year. More interestingly, Gruber (1996) argue that mutual fund managers
are able to generate abnormal performance (i.e. positive risk-adjusted returns) gross of
expenses by looking at the average expense ratio. He finds an average expense ratio of
1.33%, suggesting that mutual fund managers have superior stock-picking abilities. These
selection skills come at a great cost, however, which is too high for the average investor.
Daniel et al. (1997) conducts a comprehensive evaluation of 2500 US equity mutual
funds from the period 1975-1994, and investigate whether fund managers have sufficient
stock-picking abilities to earn back some of the costs they generate. Specifically, they
construct characteristic measures based on the market capitalization, book-to-market,
and prior one-year return portfolio benchmarks, and decompose the funds’ excess returns
into Characteristic Selectivity and Characteristic Timing measures. Daniel et al. (1997)
show that mutual funds, in contrary to most previous research, exhibit some stock-picking
skills, in particular, aggressive-growth funds. The average abnormal performance of 0.8%
per year in the paper, however, is close to the average management fee, which indicates net
neutral performance. Furthermore, they find no evidence of characteristic timing ability.
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Wermers (2000) also examine the performance of US equity mutual funds between
1975 and 1994, but decompose the performance based on net returns and stock holdings.
He finds a difference of 2.3% between the return on stock holdings and net returns for
the average mutual fund. Specifically, the stock-holdings approach indicates that mutual
funds outperform the market by 1.3%, almost enough to cover their costs.6 Moskowitz
(2000) discuss that the abnormal returns based on the characteristic selectivity measure
in Wermers’s (2000) paper might be due to the use of an inappropriate benchmark, and
argue that portfolio-based benchmarks only consist of small, illiquid and risky firms. Thus,
overstating the stock-picking abilities of fund managers.
Edelen (1999) examine 166 US mutual funds, and documents a significantly negative
average alpha of -1.63% per year based on a single-factor market model using the CRSP
value-weighted index. The negative alpha is close to the expenses of 1.72%, which indicates
prima facie that fund managers do little besides collect fees. When controlling for the
effects of flow-related liquidity trading costs, he finds no evidence of superior performance
(i.e. alpha) or bad market timing.7 Edelen (1999) argue that underperformance is not
due to fund managers’s inability to generate alpha, but results from the costs of providing
investors with liquidity service.
The evidence regarding mutual fund performance reviewed so far is based on studies
conducted by the use of unconditional performance measures. Ferson and Schadt (1996)
argue that unconditional performance measures are inappropriate as they fail to account
for the fact that fund managers change their portfolios over time, based on observable
information variables. Ferson and Schadt (1996) encourage the use of conditional perfor-
mance measures for two reasons; the first argument being that traditional measures are
unable to handle the dynamic behavior of returns, the second being the possibility that
trading behavior of managers results in more complex and interesting dynamics than those
of the underlying assets traded. Ferson and Schadt (1996) modify Jensen’s alpha and the
market timing measures of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Merton (1981) to incorporate
conditioning information, and by doing so allows for time-varying risk exposures (i.e. be-
tas). By examining monthly data of 67 mutual funds over the period 1968-1990, Ferson
and Schadt (1996) find that the conditioning information is both statistically and econom-
ically significant. At the aggregate level, their results show that the funds’ unconditional
alphas are negative more often than positive, which is similar to the evidence that Jensen
(1968) and Elton et al. (1993) interpret as an indicator of poor average performance.
Using conditional models that allow for time-varying risk exposures, they find that the
distribution of mutual fund alphas has a mean value of zero, and that the distribution of
mutual fund alphas is consistent with the neutral performance for the group.
6In the difference of 2.3%, 0.7% is attributable to lower average returns of non-stock holdings, 1.6%
to expense rations and the transaction costs of the funds.
7Edelen (1999) reports a negative alpha of -0.20% when controlling for the effects of flow-related
liquidity trading costs, which is statistically insignificant.
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Otten and Bams (2004) uses a survivorship-bias free dataset of US mutual funds pro-
vided by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and shows in a comprehensive
comparison of factor models that conditional models are a significantly better choice than
their unconditional counterparts.8 The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) stands out
being the statistically strongest of the models tested. Moreover, they show that the aggre-
gate US mutual fund industry delivers an insignificant alpha of -0.42% and 0.04% net of
expenses, measured against the unconditional and conditional Carhart (1997) four-factor
model, respectively.
Undoubtedly, the research discussed so far provides little evidence that the aggregate
mutual fund industry has created value for its investors. Nonetheless, this does not imply
that every fund underperforms their given benchmarks. In general, some fund managers
will underperform and other funds will outperform from time to time in accordance to
Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) equilibrium model, i.e. that the markets cannot be fully
efficient all the time and that temporary mispricing in the market must occur. This
implication raises the question whether differences in fund performance is attributable to
managerial skill or simply due to luck.
Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) addresses the question whether
superior performance in individual funds are attributed to skill or are simply due to
luck by employing an innovative bootstrap approach that account for non-normality in
fund returns.9 Kosowski et al. (2006) examine US mutual funds between 1975 and 2002,
and finds that approximately 10% of the funds have significant stock picking ability to
cover their costs. Fama and French (2010) use an alternative bootstrapping technique to
evaluate the performance of US mutual funds, and in contrast to Kosowski et al. (2006),
they find no evidence of performance among the top funds.10 Fama and French (2010)
agrees with Kosowski et al. (2006) regarding the worst funds, which they both argue is
due to poor skill, and not due to bad luck.
Barras et al. (2010) also argue that standard tests designed to identify mutual funds
with non-zero alphas are problematic. That is, the standard tests does not adequately
account for the presence of lucky funds. By applying new measures built on the False Dis-
covery Rate (FDR), Barras et al. (2010) quantifies the impact of luck and find that about
one-fifth of the funds in their sample truly yields negative alphas.11 More specifically, this
technique separates funds into unskilled, zero-alpha and skilled funds by controlling for
false discoveries.
8Otten and Bams (2004) use a Likelihood ratio test to determine whether the differences in explanatory
power between the models are statistically significant.
9In-depth explanations of the bootstrapping approach will be discussed in Section 4.2.
10Fama and French’s (2010) adjusted approach implicitly assume no autocorrelation in individual
mutual fund returns.
11In their study, they also find that a small proportion of funds yield positive performance prior to
1996, concentrated in the extreme right tail of the alpha distribution.
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2.1.1 Non-US Studies
Blake and Timmermann (1998) conduct a comprehensive study on 2300 UK mutual funds
during the period 1972-1995, and find that the average UK equity fund underperforms
by around 1.8% on a risk-adjusted basis. However, they find short-lived outperformance
of 0.8% during the first year of the funds’ existence. Cuthbertson et al. (2008) uses a
bootstrap methodology similar to Kosowski et al. (2006) on a dataset comprising UK
equity mutual funds from 1975 to 2002, and find evidence of stock picking abilities among
a relatively small number of the top performing funds.12
Otten and Bams (2002) conduct a comprehensive study of 506 mutual funds in five
different European countries, and compare results from both unconditional and condi-
tional factor models.13 When the unconditional four-factor model of Carhart (1997) is
used on net returns of the European countries, only UK mutual funds seem to exhibit a
significantly positive alpha. The rest of the countries have positive alphas (although not
significant) except for Germany, which exhibit a negative alpha of -1.20%. The conditional
model also indicates a significantly positive alpha on Dutch mutual funds, while the re-
sults on the other countries remain unaltered. In contrary to most US studies, Otten and
Bams’s (2002) study show that before costs, all of the countries except Germany exhibit
significantly positive alphas. In a more recent study, Ferreira et al. (2012) examine equity
mutual funds in 27 countries, in which the five countries in Otten and Bams’s (2002)
study are included, and show that mutual funds underperform the market overall. Their
findings suggest that the adverse scale effects in the US are related to liquidity constraints
faced by funds that, by virtue of their style, have to invest in small and domestic stocks.
In addition, they find that funds located in countries with liquid stock markets and strong
legal institutions display higher performance.
Previous research regarding the performance of mutual funds in Scandinavian coun-
tries, however, is quite sparse. The most recent include Dahlquist et al. (2000), Korkea-
maki and Smythe (2004), Sørensen (2009a), Christensen (2005, 2013), and Gallefoss et al.
(2015). Dahlquist et al. (2000) investigate performance and characteristics of Swedish
mutual funds, and documents neutral performance for special equity funds, bond, and
money market funds, using both unconditional and unconditional performance measures.
In contrary, the regular equity funds in their sample seem to have generated abnormal
returns, thus indicating outperformance. Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) examine the
Finnish mutual fund market from 1993 to 2000, and show that Finnish mutual funds,
in general, exhibit neutral performance. The equity funds in their sample seem to have
provided negative performance. The unpublished work of Christensen (2005) documents
no significant performance among 47 Danish mutual funds during the period 1996 to 2003.
The funds are split between equity funds and fixed income funds, and are amongst the
12Specifically, Cuthbertson et al. (2008) provides evidence of skill in 3-8% of UK mutual funds.
13The five European countries include France, Italy, Germany, UK and the Netherlands.
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funds in Europe with the lowest expenses. Still, they have delivered neutral to slightly
negative performance. Christensen (2013) also investigates the performance of 71 Danish
mutual funds between 2000 and 2010 individually and on aggregate, separating them into
different categories by using equally weighted portfolios. His findings show that 80% of
individual Danish mutual funds exhibit negative alpha estimates, of which 42% prove to
be significant. Only 7% of the funds in the sample yielded significantly positive alphas.
Sørensen (2009a) uses a dataset free of survivorship bias comprising all available Nor-
wegian equity mutual funds between 1982 and 2008. By adjusting for risk in the Norwegian
market, he finds no significant evidence of superior performance at the aggregate level.
Moreover, his bootstrap method shows weak signs of skill in the right tail of the cross-
sectional distribution of individual fund alphas, and several inferior performing funds in
the left tail that are not attributable to bad luck. Gallefoss et al. (2015) examine actively
managed Norwegian mutual funds during the period 2000-2010 using daily data, and re-
strict their sample to funds with minimum 36 months of observations. Gallefoss et al.
(2015) find that actively managed mutual funds on aggregate underperform the bench-
mark by approximately their fund fees. Furthermore, they find that funds in the right tail
(i.e. top performing funds) of the performance distribution inhabit genuine stock-picking
skills, and that the performance of the worst funds is not a result of bad luck. Ferreira
et al. (2012) include Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in their study, and also provide evi-
dence of underperformance for these countries. Thus, confirming the findings of Dahlquist
et al. (2000), Christensen (2005, 2013), Sørensen (2009a) and Gallefoss et al. (2015).
Most of the previously reviewed literature documents underperformance of mutual
fund managers, which is not improved upon in studies regarding the ability of mutual
funds to time the market. Most of the studies regarding market-timing is conducted
in the US market (See e.g. Treynor and Mazuy, 1966; Kon and Jen, 1979; Kon, 1983;
Henriksson, 1984; Chang and Lewellen, 1984; Connor and Korajczyk, 1991; Ferson and
Schadt, 1996). The majority of these studies document perverse negative market-timing
abilities among mutual fund managers. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) invented a market-
timing model by adding a quadratic square function of the market factor in Jensen’s
(1968) model. In their study, he investigates 57 mutual funds and provides evidence
on timing ability of only one of these funds. In a later study, Veit and Cheney (1982)
examine whether mutual funds, in general, appear to change their characteristic lines in
bull and bear markets. They conclude that of the funds, which in fact, changed their
characteristic lines, only three succeeded in timing the market. Connor and Korajczyk
(1991) and Hendricks et al. (1993) extends the Henriksson and Merton (1981) model, and
also conclude on the absence of market-timing abilities in US mutual funds. Goetzmann
et al. (2000) adjusts Henriksson and Merton’s (1981) method further, and supplements
the literature by providing additional evidence of negative timing abilities in US mutual
funds.
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2.2 Performance Persistence
The previously reviewed literature provides little evidence of superior performance among
mutual funds at the aggregate level. However, it is still possible that some fund managers
are able to outperform their benchmark from time to time, and that this performance
might persist over subsequent periods. Thus, persistence in mutual fund returns is of
principal importance from both an academic and practical point of view. From an aca-
demic point of view, persistence is important as the efficient market hypothesis is tested.
If past performance cannot be an indicator of future performance, the practical impor-
tance to investors is that they might be better off by engaging in passive management.
The literature on performance persistence aims to test this hypothesis.
Sharpe (1966) initiated the research on persistence in mutual fund performance by
studying rank correlations on the basis of his performance measure; the Sharpe Ratio.
By ranking funds according to their Sharpe ratio over two consecutive periods, Sharpe
(1966) find significant positive correlations, which indicates that past performance might
be an indicator of future performance. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) investigate 279 US
funds during the period 1975-1984 using multiple portfolio benchmarks with evaluation
periods of five years, and provide evidence of persistence in consecutive five-year periods.
Following up their previous work, Grinblatt and Titman (1993) examine CRSP listed
quarterly holdings of mutual fund portfolios in the period 1974-1984, and find evidence of
persistence among the funds in their sample. Specifically, they find that top performing
funds in the first half of the sample also performs well in the last part of the sample,
thus suggesting that superior performance to a certain extent is predictable ex-ante. The
strongest evidence of persistence was centered amongst funds in the category aggressive
growth.
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) show that past returns and past risk-adjusted returns
predict future performance for the period 1976 to 1988. Brown and Goetzmann (1995)
follow up this study by examining the same 1976 to 1988 period. Their results suggest
that relative abnormal performance of US mutual funds seem to persist, but mostly due
to funds that repeatedly lag the passive benchmark (the S&P500). Specifically, they
suggest two possible reasons for performance persistence, the first being that persistence
seems to be correlated across managers due to trading strategies that are not captured by
style categories or risk-adjustment techniques. The second suggestion is that the market
is unable to fully discipline the worst performing funds, and that their presence in the
sample contributes to a pattern of relative persistence.
The earliest studies that provide evidence of performance persistence, however, might
be prone to survivorship bias as Malkiel (1995) suggest, thus the evidence is less valid.
Malkiel (1995) utilizes a unique data set comprising all existing US equity mutual funds
from 1971 to 1991 to account for the influence of survivorship bias. He finds evidence on
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performance persistence for seven out of nine periods in the 1970’s.14 Hendricks et al.
(1993) investigate persistence in US mutual funds between 1974 and 1988 by regressing
current performance on quarterly lags. He finds evidence of persistence for up to four
quarters, denoting the effect as “Hot hands”. Using a dataset free of survivorship bias,
Carhart (1997) argues that the “Hot hands” phenomenon found by Hendricks et al. (1993)
is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).15
His results suggest that fund managers possess little stock selection skill since superior
funds generate their returns simply by holding stocks that recently have had abnormal
returns. When controlling for the momentum effect, Carhart (1997) finds no evidence
of persistence among the top performing funds. However, Kosowski et al. (2006) applies
a bootstrap approach to assess significance on the same data sample as Carhart (1997)
and find that performance seems to persist among the top performing funds. In his
study, Wermers (1997) support the findings of Carhart (1997), and argue that active use
of momentum strategies is the reason for short-term persistence. He concludes that top
performing funds during one year also are the top performers the following year, and that
this pattern corresponds exactly to the pattern found in the momentum effect in stock
returns.
Moreover, several studies provide evidence on significantly positive alphas (gross of
costs) when following a hypothetical momentum strategy that implies buying prior win-
ners and selling prior loser funds (See e.g. Hendricks et al., 1993; Carhart, 1997; Kosowski
et al., 2006). Additionally, Busse et al. (2010) provides evidence on weak performance
persistence for institutional funds. Other studies have, more specifically, found stronger
evidence of persistence amongst early-phase funds, small-cap growth funds and funds with
no load (See e.g. Gruber, 1996; Blake and Timmermann, 1998; Bollen and Busse, 2005;
Huij and Verbeek, 2007).
Most of the previously reviewed studies are focused on long-run performance persis-
tence.16 More recent studies, however, provide evidence that performance seems to persist
in the short run (See e.g. Berk and Green, 2004; Bollen and Busse, 2005; Huij and Ver-
beek, 2007). Berk and Green (2004) find that abnormal performance persists over shorter
evaluation periods. Over longer time periods, they find no persistence among the top per-
forming funds in their sample. Bollen and Busse (2005) use daily frequency data on mutual
fund returns to allow for short evaluation periods. Specifically, they establish quarterly
rankings based on the funds’ abnormal returns, and then measure the performance over
subsequent quarters. Bollen and Busse (2005) show that performance persistence exists
14In the 1980’s, however, Malkiel (1995) find only three periods with statistically significant evidence
of return reversals.
15By including a momentum factor in his four-factor model, Carhart (1997) finds that persistence largely
disappears. Among the lowest performers, however, persistence arises from persistently high expenses.
16These studies differ in respect to the methodologies used, but the non-accessibility of short frequency
data is common, thus making it hard to investigate short-run performance persistence.
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among top funds when using short evaluation periods, but that it seems to disappear
when longer evaluation periods are used. Huij and Verbeek (2007) investigate short-run
performance persistence between 1984 and 2003 by using monthly frequency data. They
employ a Bayes approach to cope with short ranking periods, and find that performance is
persistent even beyond load fees when the funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on
their 12-month past performance.17 Overall, empirical evidence shows that post-ranking
returns largely disappear when longer evaluation periods are used. Hence, superior per-
formance persistence is considered to be, if any, a short-lived phenomenon.
2.2.1 Non-US Studies
Blake and Timmermann (1998) investigate performance persistence by examining 2300
UK mutual funds during 1972-1995. By using a similar recursive portfolio approach as of
Hendricks et al. (1993), they find evidence of persistence in portfolios composed by prior
winners. Prior losers, on the other hand, produced significantly negative alphas. These
findings are in line with Otten and Bams (2002), who finds a spread between the two
portfolios comprising prior winners and prior losers of 6.08% per year for UK funds.
In a more recent study, Vidal-Garcia (2013) investigates performance persistence of
actively managed mutual fund returns for six European countries over the 1988-2010 pe-
riod. He applies several conventional tests for persistence and applies the same bootstrap
approach following Kosowski et al. (2006) to test for significance. His results indicate
significant evidence of performance persistence among European mutual funds, and that
these results are robust under the non-normality of the funds’ return distribution. In
addition, he finds that the performance spread between prior winners and prior losers is
largest among UK mutual funds, thus confirming the findings of Otten and Bams (2002).
The studies of Dahlquist et al. (2000), Christensen (2005) and Sørensen (2009a) do
not provide general evidence of persistence in the Scandinavian sector. More specifically,
following the same approach as Carhart (1997), Sørensen (2009a) analyze persistence
among Norwegian mutual funds during the period 1985-2008. By sorting funds into
quintile portfolios based on lagged one-year returns, he find no evidence of persistence
amongst top and bottom performing funds. Gallefoss et al. (2015) use daily data, and
are thus able to allow for shorter ranking periods. They find evidence on performance
persistence in the performance spread, and confirm the findings of Vidal-Garcia (2013). In
addition, their results indicate that abnormally bad performance of the worst performing
funds strongly persists, which is in line with the findings of Bollen and Busse (2005).
17Specifically, the top decile funds in Huij and Verbeek’s (2007) sample that earns significantly abnormal
returns are mainly early-phase small cap/growth funds.
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2.3 Time-Variability
The evidence regarding the performance and persistence in mutual fund returns reviewed
so far is based on studies conducted by the use of unconditional models that assumes
constant betas, and conditional models that only account for potential time-variation in
betas. Previous studies also show that time-variation in alphas can lead to biased OLS
alpha estimates (See e.g. Grinblatt and Titman, 1989b; Glosten and Jagannathan, 1994;
Christopherson et al., 1998).
Krueger and Callaway (1995) investigate persistence in the performance of 41 aggres-
sive growth, 229 growth funds, and 35 equity income mutual funds by examining two
consecutive three-year periods. By using the Sharpe (1966), Treynor (1965), and Jensen
(1968) performance measures, they show that fund performance indeed varies by the
period. Specifically, aggressive growth funds prove to be the riskiest of the categories.
Christopherson et al. (1998) propose an extension of Ferson and Schadt’s (1996) con-
ditional model that allows for both betas and alphas to be conditioned on public in-
formation. Specifically, they document that time-varying alpha measures are superior in
predicting future performance as compared to unconditional alphas or raw returns, even
though none of which allows for ex-ante detection of real investment skill. Avramov and
Wermers (2006) exploit this further by incorporating public information in a Bayesian
setting, and argue that actively managed funds add more value than documented in pre-
vious literature. Specifically, they analyze the performance of different portfolio strategies
by incorporating predictability in managerial skill, fund’s risk-loadings, and benchmark
returns. Overall, Avramov and Wermers (2006) provide evidence on cross-sectional fund
differences by showing that funds are superior within industry stock pickers.
However, even though the abovementioned studies confirm that it is important to ac-
count for time-variation in mutual fund alphas and betas, they do not explicitly examine
the risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds in economic downturns and upturns. Most
of the previous research assumes the functional relationship between excess returns and
predetermined factors to be constant rather than vary through different states in the econ-
omy. Moskowitz (2000) argue that mutual funds may, in fact, add value by performing
well during economic downturns. By computing performance measures over two subsam-
ples by using the NBER classifications of recessionary and non-recessionary periods, he
shows that active mutual funds generate an additional 6% per year during recessions.
His results shows that funds earn an additional 1% per year during recessions also when
adjusting fund returns for size, book-to-market equity, and momentum premium. This
indicates that active managers deliver returns when investors need them the most, and
that examining their unconditional performance may understate their abilities. However,
Moskowitz (2000) is unconvinced of these results given the paucity of recessionary periods
over the 20-year sample and suggest that his findings might be pure chance.
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Kosowski et al. (2006), Ang and Chen (2007) and Glode et al. (2011) document that
both the size and value factors in their conditional models turn out to be insignificant,
and argue that benchmarks with multiple factors might be a better way to account for the
time-variability in the market factor. As a suggestion to this problem, Mamaysky et al.
(2008) make use of a Kalman filter to track alpha and beta dynamics, and allows the
coefficients to depend on an unobservable variable that itself follows an AR(1) process.
This improves upon the alpha and beta estimation from conventional OLS models that
solely relies on macroeconomic variables to explain the variation in coefficients over time.
In contrary to Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson et al. (1998), the model
allows for ex-ante detection of real investment skill. However, despite the improved in-
and out-of-sample properties of the Kalman filter, the alphas in the model are measured
unconditionally.
A model that overcomes some of the problems inherent with the abovementioned
approaches was introduced as early as in 1989. Hamilton (1989) developed a Markov
regime-switching model for dealing with asymmetric business cycles and structural breaks
in time-series data. The major advantage of this model is that it allows for a continu-
ous state probability, where a first-order Markov process governs the transition between
the states. By using maximum likelihood estimation, the transitions can be obtained
recursively along with other parameters in the model.
The more recent study by Kosowski (2011) shows that traditional unconditional per-
formance measures in fact understate the value added by active mutual fund managers
during recessionary states in the economy, when the marginal utility of wealth is high. He
conducts a comprehensive analysis on business cycle asymmetries in mutual fund perfor-
mance by investigating US domestic equity funds in recessions and expansions from 1962
to 2005. Kosowski (2011) identify recessionary and non-recessionary periods using two
methods; the NBER classification of business cycle dates and a two-state Markov regime-
switching model. His research shows that the negative mutual fund underperformance
documented in literature is attributable to expansion periods when funds have negative
risk-adjusted alpha, and not during recessions when the risk-adjusted alpha is positive.
However, by using the NBER recession dates as state indicators, a limitation is that it
only becomes available ex post.
Kacperczyk et al. (2010) construct a model on fund manager’s attention allocation and
portfolio choice over the business cycle. They show that the portfolio dispersion is higher
when skilled fund managers engage in market timing, and that these results are true
both among skilled managers and between skilled and unskilled managers. Interestingly,
their research indicates that recessionary states in the economy are the times when skilled
managers outperform the most, which is consistent with Kosowski (2011). In addition,
they find that mutual fund portfolios exhibit more cross-sectional dispersion and generate
higher abnormal performance in recession periods.
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Qiu et al. (2011) investigate business cycles and mutual fund timing performance of US
mutual funds by examining daily data from the period 1998 to 2009. They incorporate
a regime-switching framework into Treynor and Mazuy’s (1966) model, and allow for
switching between two regimes (e.g. up and down markets) that is governed by a first-
order Markov process with time-varying transition probabilities. By stratifying the funds
into nine categories based on their stated investment objective, they show that the regime-
switching model captures the asymmetric timing performance, whereas the single-regime
model does not.18 Further, they find that fund managers have significant perverse timing
abilities in expansions periods, but not in recessionary states in the economy.
3 Data
This section presents the data used in the empirical analysis of this study. Details regarding
the data and its providers will be reviewed throughout the following sections.
3.1 Norwegian Mutual Funds
Our mutual fund data set comprises 98 Norwegian actively managed open-end domestic
equity funds. These funds’ investment mandate is to invest primarily in Norwegian equi-
ties (i.e. minimum 80% must be invested in domestic equities). We restrict our sample
only to consider Norwegian equity mutual funds to be consistent regarding the choice
of benchmarks used in this study. By excluding funds with different risk exposures, we
only require one specific benchmark spanning the investment opportunity set. This will
allow for more accurate benchmark returns when computing risk-adjusted performance.
The data set consists of all available active Norwegian equity mutual funds at the Oslo
Stock Exchange between 1983 and 2014, both surviving and non-surviving.19 The choice
of period is simple as only a few funds existed before 1983, and it covers almost the entire
lifetime of the Norwegian mutual fund market. We omit funds that are passively managed
as they only pursue neutral investment strategies.
To compute the funds’ returns, we have obtained historical data on both daily and
monthly Net Asset Value (NAV) for each fund from The Oslo Stock Exchange Information
Services.20 The NAV is computed by summing the current value of all stocks contained
in the funds’ portfolio, deducting expenses such as management fees and other ongoing
18The categories include; all funds, retail funds, retail aggressive, retail growth, retail income and
growth, institutional, institutional aggressive, institutional growth, and institutional growth and income
funds.
19Pareto Investment Fund B and Pareto Investment Fund C have been omitted from the data sample;
these funds are practically the same fund as Pareto Investment Fund A. The differences are fee structures
with respect to the amount invested in the fund.
20We thank Truls Henrik Hollen at The Oslo Stock Exchange Information Services (Oslo Børs Infor-
masjon) for generously providing us with the data.
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trading costs, then divide this figure by the funds’ total outstanding shares. The NAV is
net of expenses such as management costs and fees, but disregard load charges associated
with purchases and redemptions. Since most of the funds report NAV on different trading
dates during the earliest years of the sample, we have constructed monthly NAVs by using
the last day of reported NAV in each month for all funds. We assume that intra-month
dividend payments are reinvested in the fund. Consequently, the one-month simple return
between t and t− 1 is defined as follows:
ri,t =
NAVt −NAVt−1
NAVt−1
where NAVi,t is the net asset value of fund i at day t, and ri,t is the simple return
of fund i at day t. In total, this yields 14.937 observations of monthly returns, which
amount to approximately 13 years of return history for each fund, on average. Table
A.I in Appendix A displays the exact number of funds available at the end of each year,
and how many funds that were born and liquidated throughout the entire sample period.
Additionally, the table shows returns for an equally weighted portfolio of all funds in our
sample compared to the Oslo Stock Exchange All Share index.21
3.2 Interest Rate
We construct excess returns by deducting a proxy of the risk-free interest rate. Treasury
bills are widely used for this purpose in the literature, but Norwegian T-bills have proven
to be far less liquid than Treasury bills in larger markets. Hence, T-bills might be an
unsuitable proxy for the Norwegian market. Ødegaard (2015) argue that the Norwegian
Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) is the most appropriate for this purpose. Following
Ødegaard (2015), we construct a short-term (monthly) risk-free rate from the one-month
NIBOR rate, which reflects the pricing of loans in the interbank market. The period
before 1986 is however slightly messy regarding interest data. For the period between
1983 and 1986 we therefore use the overnight NIBOR rate as an approximation for the
risk-free rate.22 The one-month risk-free rate at time t is estimated as follows: 23
rf t = (1 +NIBOR)1/12 − 1
21The equally weighted portfolio is constructed by first calculating returns for each fund in period t.
Then, these returns are concatenated into a return-vector and divided by the total number of observations
in that period. This type of weighting gives the same importance to each fund in a portfolio, regardless
of size. Thus, all of the funds are considered evenly.
22The data is obtained from The Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank). For more details and expla-
nations about Norwegian interest rate data, see Eitrheim et al. (2004).
23Figure B.1 in Appendix B plots the monthly risk-free interest rate. The large spike between 1992
and 1993 as can be seen in the figure is attributable to the currency crisis during that period.
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3.3 The Market Proxy
Due to non-observability of the true market portfolio (See e.g. Roll, 1977, 1980), we
need to choose an appropriate benchmark as a reasonable approximation of the market.
In practice, a market-wide index of stocks is usually applied as a representation of the
true market portfolio. In Norway, the Oslo Børs Mutual Fund Index (OSEFX) serve as
the benchmark for most of the Norwegian equity mutual funds registered at the OSE.
This index would be a natural choice of benchmark, since it is designed to meet specific
regulations and diversification requirements in compliance with the directives for fund
investments given by UCITS. The OSEFX, however, cannot serve as a market proxy
for the whole period between 1983 and 2014 as it originated in December 1995. We
therefore disregard the OSEFX as a benchmark in this study, as we require only one
specific benchmark spanning the sample period.
In this study, we apply the Oslo Stock Exchange All Share index (OSEAX) as the
market proxy for use in the performance models.24 The OSEAX contains all listed shares
on the OSE, and is adjusted for dividends. This index is a widely used benchmark, and
provides returns for the whole sample period between 1983 and 2014. Table II below
displays average returns for the OSEAX, the equally weighted portfolio of all funds and
the equally weighed portfolio of dead funds for various time periods in the sample period.
Panel A shows that, on aggregate, the average mutual fund has slightly outperformed
the market by 0.12% per year. Panel B shows the total returns for the first half of the
sample between 1983 and 1998. The average fund performance was particularly strong
during that period, outperforming the market by 0.73% per year. This is no surprise
considering that no funds died during that part of the sample. Conversely, the market
outperformed the equally weighted fund portfolio during the second half of the sample, as
displayed by Panel C. During this period, the OSEAX outperformed the average mutual
fund by approximately 0.50% per year. It should be noted that surviving funds outper-
formed non-surviving funds during both periods. This demonstrates the importance of
including liquidated funds in the data sample, as failure to do so could impose the issue
of survivorship bias in mutual fund returns.25 Figure 2 at the end of the section plots the
cumulative returns for the OSEAX and equally weighted portfolios comprising all funds
and non-surviving funds only and illustrate these results graphically.
24The data is obtained as total return indices from Reuters Datastream for the period 1983 to 2014.
25The issue of Survivorship Bias in mutual fund returns is discussed in further detail in Section 3.5.
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Table II
Descriptive Statistics of Benchmarks and Fund Returns
The table shows descriptive statistics on returns from the OSE All Share index (OSEAX),
and returns on equally weighted portfolios comprising both all funds and non-surviving funds.
Columns 1 - 6 display average return, standard deviation, maximum and minimum return,
skewness and kurtosis. Panel A shows the whole sample period from 1983 to 2014, whereas
Panels B and C show the first (1983 to 1998) and second half (1999 to 2014) of the sample.
Average returns and standard deviations are annualized, whereas the remaining statistics are
reported monthly.
Average Standard Max Min Skewness Kurtosisreturn deviation
Panel A: 1983:01 - 2014:12
OSEAX 13.87 21.71 17.45 -27.43 -0.83 5.22
EW (All) 13.99 21.79 17.39 -25.61 -0.77 4.86
EW (Dead) 13.23 21.74 17.39 -25.54 -0.82 5.02
Panel B: 1983:01 - 1998:12
OSEAX 15.32 22.71 17.45 -27.43 -0.83 5.24
EW (All) 16.05 21.62 17.39 -23.96 -0.69 4.78
EW (Dead) 15.73 21.16 17.39 -23.32 -0.73 4.90
Panel C: 1999:01 - 2014:12
OSEAX 12.43 20.71 15.04 -23.93 -0.85 5.09
EW (All) 11.93 22.00 15.68 -25.61 -0.84 4.91
EW (Dead) 10.74 22.35 15.62 -25.54 -0.89 5.08
3.4 Risk Factors
To estimate the multifactor models employed in this study, we need return-series on the
SMB (Small-Minus-Big), HML (High-Minus-Low), and PR1YR (Momentum) risk factors
of Fama and French (1993) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The Fama and French
(1993) factors are constructed using value-weighted portfolios formed on size and value
(i.e. book-to-market ratios). The SMB factor is the average return on portfolios with
a long position in small capitalization companies minus the average return of portfolios
consisting of large capitalization companies. HML is the average return on value portfolios
(high book-to-market ratio) minus the average return on growth portfolios (low book-to-
market ratio). The momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is constructed by
holding long positions in portfolios consisting of stocks with the highest one-year lagged
returns, minus portfolios consisting of stocks with the lowest one-year lagged returns, i.e.
prior one-year (PR1YR).26
In Norway, Professor Bernt Arne Ødegaard has constructed similar factors for the
Norwegian equity market by using stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange.27 We have ob-
tained monthly return-series on these factors from his website.28 Table III below reports
descriptive statistics on these factors for the entire sample period and the two sub-periods.
26See Kenneth French’s website and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for more detailed explanations on
how these factors are constructed.
27Details regarding the construction of Norwegian risk factors and their ability to explain differences
in cross-sectional returns is discussed in Ødegaard (2015) and Næs et al. (2009).
28We thank Bernt Arne Ødegaard for the opportunity to use his asset pricing data at the OSE.
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Over the entire sample period, it becomes evident from Panel A that the SMB and PR1YR
factors generated the highest average returns of 9.76% and 8.69%, respectively. The size
and value factors exhibits the highest returns in the first half of the sample, with average
returns of 11.64% and 8.86%, respectively. Conversely, both SMB and HML show con-
siderable lower performance during the second half of the sample with average returns
of 7.88% and -0.05%, respectively. The market premium and the PR1YR factor, in con-
trary, show considerably higher returns in the second part of the sample. Panel B displays
standard deviations, and we observe the volatility is highest for all factors during the first
half of the sample. In the whole sample period, the market displays the highest volatility
with a standard deviation of 22.33%, whereas SMB displays the lowest volatility with
a standard deviation of 15.31%. Panel C reports cross-correlations between the factors
over the entire sample period. We see that SMB and PR1YR are negatively correlated
with the market proxy with correlation coefficients of -0.417 and -0.123, respectively. The
HML factor, on the other hand, shows a slightly positive correlation of 0.083 with the
market. Furthermore, HML is negatively correlated with the SMB factor and PR1YR
is negatively correlated with the HML factor. The correlation coefficients are -0.137 and
-0.060, respectively.
Table III
Descriptive Statistics of Factor Returns
The table provides summary statistics in various sample periods for the Norwegian factors used
in the unconditional four-factor model of Carhart (1997). MKT in Column 1 is the excess return
on the market proxy (i.e. the OSEAX minus the risk-free rate). Columns 2 and 3 show SMB
and HML, which are the size and value factors of Fama and French (1993). Column 4 shows the
one-year momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), PR1YR. Panel A shows average
returns, whereas Panels B and C display standard deviations and cross-correlations between
the factors. Average returns and standard deviations are annualized. Returns and standard
deviations are reported in percent.
MKT SMB HML PR1YR
Panel A: Average returns
1983:01 - 2014:12 6.60 9.76 4.40 8.69
1983:01 - 1998:12 5.74 11.64 8.86 7.37
1999:01 - 2014:12 7.46 7.88 -0.05 10.01
Panel B: Standard deviations
1983:01 - 2014:12 22.33 15.31 17.17 17.03
1983:01 - 1998:12 22.74 16.97 18.00 17.56
1999:01 - 2014:12 21.98 13.47 16.25 16.51
Panel C: Correlation matrix
MKT 1.000
SMB -0.417 1.000
HML 0.083 -0.137 1.000
PR1YR -0.123 0.145 -0.060 1.000
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3.5 Potential Biases in Mutual Fund Returns
Previous studies on mutual fund performance have indicated that characteristics and
sample selection regarding the data set could produce biased results. It is important to
include both surviving and non-surviving funds in mutual fund performance evaluations,
as failure to do so may impose Survivorship Bias (See e.g. Brown et al., 1992; Malkiel, 1995;
Elton et al., 1996b). Survivorship bias is a property of sample selection, and arises when
liquidated funds (e.g. due to bad performance) are removed from the data sample. Existing
funds in a data set will typically consist of a mixture of different strategies regarding
management style and risk exposure. By eliminating non-surviving funds, strategies that
have been proven to be unsuccessful ex-post are excluded from the analysis. This imposes
complications since strategies that have yielded high returns tend to survive. Thus, the
average fund returns will be biased upwards, which makes the estimate of aggregate
mutual fund performance unrealistically high.
Furthermore, a look-ahead bias might arise if one requires a fund to survive a minimum
period. Carpenter and Lynch (1999) discover that the look-ahead bias also might occur
when year-end returns are missing or excluded in the data sample due to requirements
regarding fund size. Elton et al. (1996b) propose treatments for these biases, specifically
a “follow the money” strategy that implies tracing the fund after its disappearance.
To gain the most accurate understanding of fund performance, our mutual fund data
set includes both surviving funds (54) and non-surviving funds (44). Note that non-
surviving funds may have been merged with other funds as a result of acquisitions in the
fund industry, or simply been closed down due to bad performance. Following Elton et al.
(1996b), we assume that if a fund is merged with another fund, the money is invested
in the acquiring funds according to merger terms. Additionally, we impose no specific
requirements regarding fund size or number of observations.29 Figure 2 below displays
the cumulative returns development of equally weighted portfolios of all funds and non-
surviving funds. As can be observed from Panel A in the figure, the portfolio comprising
only non-surviving funds has considerably lower returns than the equally weighted port-
folio comprising all funds. We also emphasized this matter in Table II, where the equally
weighted portfolio of liquidated funds underperformed all funds in the full sample, as well
in both sub-periods. This illustrates the importance of including both surviving and non-
surviving funds in our data sample, as failure to do so would clearly impose survivorship
bias in the mutual fund data set.30
29In our sample, GAMBAK Oppkjøp is the smallest fund with 17 monthly observations. Nordea Vekst
is the largest with a total of 377 monthly observations.
30If non-surviving funds were not to be included in our sample, the potential survivorship bias will be
around 0.428 percentage points p.a. See Appendix C for further details and specifications.
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Figure 2. Cumulative returns on equally weighted portfolios and the OSEAX. This
figure plots cumulative returns of the OSE All Share index, the equally weighted portfolio
that contains all available actively managed funds at the Oslo Stock Exchange between 1983
and 2014, and an equally weighted portfolio comprising only funds that have died during that
period. Panel A depicts the entire sample period between 1983 and 2014, including the equally
weighted portfolio of non-surviving funds. Panels B and C refer to the first and second half of
the sample, 1983-1998 and 1999-2014, respectively.
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4 The Performance of Norwegian Mutual Funds
In this section, we investigate whether Norwegian mutual funds generate risk-adjusted re-
turns (i.e. alpha), and if so, whether the abnormal performance is attributable to skilled
or lucky fund managers. First, we discuss the theoretical foundation for the performance
study, and rationalize our choice of performance model. Second, we investigate the ag-
gregate performance of the funds in our sample. Finally, we disentangle skill from luck in
the performance distribution, and investigate whether Norwegian mutual fund managers
exhibit superior stock-picking abilities or if the performance is attributable to random
chance as economic theory suggest.
4.1 Model Selection
Traditional methods for performance evaluations usually entail employing factor models
for returns, and interpret the intercepts from time-series regressions. These factor models
serve as performance benchmarks, which we need to specify to evaluate performance,
and thereby the stock-picking skills of fund managers. The following subsections briefly
discuss our choice of multifactor performance models.
4.1.1 The Unconditional Four-Factor Model
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as first presented by Sharpe (1964), Lintner
(1965) and Mossin (1966) aims to describe the relationship between risk and expected
returns for a given asset. The single-factor model of Jensen (1968) rests upon the CAPM
equation, and is the foundation for all risk-based performance measures. Jensen’s alpha,
αi, of fund i is given by the intercept of the model as presented below and is the measure
of performance relative to the market at time t:
ri,t − rf,t = αi︸︷︷︸
selection skills
+ βi(rm,t − rf,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium
+ εi,t︸︷︷︸
idiosyncratic risk
(1)
where ri,t is the return on fund i in period t, and rf,t is the risk-free rate at time t. The
single factor, the market risk premium is given by the market return in excess of the
risk-free rate, rm,t − rf,t, and βi is the market risk exposure for fund i. The βi estimate
is the fund portfolio’s exposure to non-diversifiable risk (i.e. systematic risk) that the
market factor proxy for. The error term, εt, has an expectation of zero, and represents
the idiosyncratic risk unexplained by the model. If α is positive and significant, the fund
manager is able to earn returns that are higher than expected given the portfolio’s level
of risk as implied by the CAPM. Conversely, a negative α indicates poor performance by
the fund manager.
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By using the single-factor model for mutual fund performance evaluation, one implic-
itly assumes empirical validity of the CAPM. This means that the model characterize the
true data generating process of the excess returns produced by fund managers. The single-
factor model, however, only takes into account one specific risk factor, the market factor.
This means that by using the single-factor model for mutual fund performance evaluation
one implicitly assumes that a single market proxy can approximate the fund manager’s
investment behavior. Several studies have questioned the adequacy of the single-factor
benchmark for performance evaluation and provided evidence that the single-factor model
of Jensen (1968) is not appropriate, as it do not capture cross-sectional differences in av-
erage stock returns (See e.g. Elton et al., 1993; Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997).
Research on the behavior of expected stock returns lead to the development of multifactor
asset pricing models that accounts for several non-diversifiable risk factors in expected
stock returns.
In their famous paper, Fama and French (1993) augment Jensen’s model to explain
the cross-sectional pattern of average returns in the US stock market. They show that
the market risk is not the only relevant risk factor in the cross-section of asset returns,
and propose a three-factor model to better be able to describe the behavior of expected
stock returns. Their model can be run as a regression that includes two additional risk
factors, the size (the higher average return of small cap stocks relative to large cap stocks)
and value (the higher average return of value stocks relative to growth stocks) premiums.
The three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) can be estimated as follows:
ri,t − rf,t = αi + β1i ·MKTt + β2i · SMBt + β3i ·HMLt + εi,t (2)
where SMBt (Small-Minus-Big) and HMLt (High-Minus-Low) are the size and book-to-
market risk factors of Fama and French (1993) at time t. The beta coefficients, β1i, β2i,
and β3i is the corresponding exposure to the MKT, SMB and HML factors for fund i,
respectively. That is, the coefficients relate to the exposure to the sources of systematic
risk each of the factors behaves as a proxy for. Fama and French (1996) argue that two
additional premiums proxy for non-market systematic risk factors. As in the single-factor
model, the intercept αi is the measure of abnormal performance relative to the fund
portfolio’s exposure to the risk factors. Motivated by the three-factor model’s inability to
explain cross-sectional variations in momentum-sorted portfolio returns, Carhart (1997)
augments the three-factor model by including the one-year momentum factor (PR1YR) of
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The PR1YR factor considers the higher expected return of
stocks that have performed well during the prior year relative to poor performing stocks
(i.e. contrarian stocks). The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) is specified as follows:
ri,t − rf,t = αi + β1i ·MKTt + β2i · SMBt + β3i ·HMLt + β4i · PR1Y Rt + εi,t (3)
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We use Carhart’s (1997) model as our primary performance model due to the following
reasons. First and foremost, the four-factor model is able to control for four common risk
factors in stock returns that cannot be removed by diversification. Consider a fund man-
ager that increases his exposure to one (or more) of these factors. The increased returns
he gains will be offset by increased systematic risk that cannot be removed by diversifica-
tion. From finance theory, it follows that non-diversifiable risk is the only relevant risk in
a well-diversified portfolio. Thus, the increase in expected returns that the fund manager
gains by taking on this added risk would only be a reward for the increased systematic
risk relevant for the portfolio, and not a reflection of selection skills. Furthermore, the
model is advantageous as it can be interpreted as a performance attribution model, were
the four risk coefficients can be seen as factor-mimicking portfolios that represent mean
returns attributable to four elementary trading strategies. That is, high-versus-low beta
stocks, large-versus-small capitalization stocks, value-versus-growth stocks, and one-year
return momentum versus contrarian stocks. In this way, the model is used to estimate
the added value of active fund managers by measuring the fund’s return that cannot be
explained by the exposure to systematic risk factors. When evaluating mutual fund per-
formance it is important that the benchmarks used in the performance models include
all risk factors relevant for the various investment strategies of fund managers. Thus,
Carhart’s (1997) model is preferable as it allows us to estimate alpha in a more correct
sense, i.e. by controlling for the added systematic risk fund managers face by following
four elementary investment strategies.
Moreover, Carhart (1997) finds that the four-factor model substantially improves on
the average pricing errors of the single-factor CAPM and three-factor model. To our
knowledge, there has been conducted little on how the risk factors in the four-factor model
behave concerning Norwegian equity mutual funds. Thus, it is imperative to examine
whether the model is suitable to our data. To gain some insight, we estimate the four-
factor model of Carhart (1997) for each of the 98 funds in our sample and investigate fund
loadings on the four factors. The results are presented in Table IV below. The average
load on the market proxy is close to 1, which is not surprising considering that the funds
in our sample invest primarily in domestic equities. Furthermore, it is evident from the
table that the average loading on the SMB, HML and PR1YR factors are quite small.
This is, however, the result of a mixture of individual funds that exhibit high and low
factor loadings. Thus, even though active Norwegian funds on average are not loading
heavily on these factors, the loadings fluctuate heavily across the individual funds in our
sample. Table IV also reports the proportion of funds whose factor loading is statistically
significant at various levels. For example, the PR1YR factor is significant at the 5%
level for approximately 54% of the funds in our sample. Based on these results and the
discussion above, we conclude that the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) seems suitable
to use for performance evaluations in the Norwegian mutual fund market.
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Table IV
Individual Factor Loadings
This table provides a summary of the individual factor loadings (i.e. beta coefficients) obtained
by running time-series regressions on all 98 funds in our sample. Column 1 reports the average
load, whereas Columns 2 and 3 report the maximum and minimum load. Columns 4 and 5 report
the fraction of funds significant at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Column 6
provides the cross-sectional standard deviation of the coefficients. Significance levels are reported
in percent. The sample period is 1983 to 2014.
βAV ERAGE βMAX βMIN
Significant Significant
σ25% level 10% level
MKT 0.995 1.235 0.547 100.00 100.00 0.100
SMB 0.097 0.582 -0.194 38.78 42.86 0.149
HML -0.086 0.193 -0.430 43.88 59.18 0.117
PR1YR -0.044 0.404 -0.423 54.08 60.20 0.139
4.1.2 The Conditional Four-Factor Model
By using the unconditional four-factor model one implicitly assume the funds to have
constant exposure to the four risk factors over time. In a real life scenario, fund man-
agers trade upon varying market conditions, and have changing information about future
expectations of risk and return and thus, reconstitute their fund portfolios accordingly.
For example, general macroeconomic cycles may influence a fund manager’s inclination
to bear risk. Consequently, estimating average alphas for the entire sample period based
on a fixed beta estimate might produce spurious results (Ferson and Schadt, 1996). Con-
ditional models allow for the possibility that a fund’s risk exposure might vary over time
depending on lagged public information variables. The conditional version of Carhart’s
(1997) four-factor model that controls for time-varying market exposure can be specified
as follows:
ri,t− rf,t = αi+β1iMKTt+β2iSMBt+β3iHMLt+β4iPR1Y Rt+
K∑
j=1
Bi,j[Zj,t−1MKTt] + εit (4)
where Zj,t−1 is a vector of predetermined information variables that represents public
information available at time t − 1, and Bi,j is a vector of response coefficients of the
conditional beta with respect to the information in Zj,t−1. Hence, the time-varying market
beta is a linear relation between the average (unconditional) beta and the conditional
instruments: βi,j =
∑K
j=1 Bi,j [Zj,t−1MKTt] + β1i. Note that in this model, we have assumed
that the information variables only affect the market exposure. We could augment the
model further by adding interaction terms for the other three risk factors. For example,
we can add ∑Kj=1 Bi,j [Zj,t−1HMLt] if we think that the value premium varies over time.
Specifically, conditional models aim to measure the time-variation in risk exposures
by using a vector of predetermined information variables that fund managers can use as
a tool in their investment strategy. Several information variables have been suggested for
this purpose in previous literature. Among others, some of these include variables such
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as the T-bill yield, market dividend yield, lagged market return, and a quality spread
between government and corporate bonds (See e.g. Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Otten and
Bams, 2004). In this study, we consider the following three variables: (1) lagged growth
on industrial production, (2) lagged market return, and (3) lagged yield on the oil price.31
These variables have also been proven to be useful for predicting stock returns (See e.g.
Pesaran and Timmermann, 1995; Sørensen, 2009b).32
In order to keep the conditional model parsimonious and to ease the interpretability of
the model, only a single conditional variable is considered in this study. To gain insight on
which of the three information variables that best suits our data, we first examine whether
the market exposure of the aggregate portfolio of all funds in our sample depends on the
lagged growth on industrial production, lagged yield on the oil price and the lagged market
return. Results are reported in Appendix D. In general, we find that the conditional
variables do not improve the model in terms of goodness of fit. Moreover, none of the
conditional variables are individually statistically significant, and they have marginal
economic significance at the aggregate level. The aggregate portfolio’s market exposure
is most sensitive to the lagged yield on the oil price. This variable is also bordering
on statistical significance. To gain further insight on the relevance of the variables, we
also estimate conditional four-factor models that controls for time-varying MKT loadings
for each individual fund. Table V below shows that there is considerable variation in
individual loadings on the three conditional variables. The lagged yield on the oil price
appears to be the variable that is significant for most funds at the individual level.
Table V
Individual Loadings on the Conditional Variables
The table reports individual loadings on the three information variables considered in our study;
the lagged yield on the oil price, lagged industrial production growth, and lagged market return,
respectively. Column 1 reports the average load, whereas Columns 2 and 3 report the maximum
and minimum load. Columns 4 and 5 report the fraction of variables significant at the 5% and
10% significance level, respectively. Column 6 provides the cross-sectional standard deviation of
the coefficients. Significance levels are reported in percent. The sample period is 1983 to 2014.
BAV ERAGE BMAX BMIN
Significant Significant
σ2Information variables 5% level 10% level
Oil Price t−1 -0.024 0.507 -0.265 19.39 27.56 0.276
Market Returnt−1 -0.010 0.274 -0.211 11.23 18.37 0.112
Industrial Productiont−1 -0.004 0.075 -0.131 10.21 17.35 0.082
31Return-series on industrial production for Norway from 1983 to 2014 is obtained from OECD Statis-
tics. Data on the Brent Crude oil price is collected from Macrobond.
32Because data on the most commonly used information variables was difficult to obtain due to our long
sample period, we advocate other information variables that have been proven to be useful for predicting
stock returns.
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Overall, our results suggest that the unconditional four-factor model explains returns
on actively managed Norwegian mutual funds reasonably well. Conditional variables add
little to the explanatory power of the model. Thus, the main focus in this study will be
on results from the unconditional four-factor model. However, since the lagged yield on
the oil price is statistically and economically significant for a sizeable fraction of the funds
in our sample, we also perform our tests using a conditional model where we include the
lagged yield on the oil price as an information variable and briefly comment on the results.
4.2 The Bootstrap Methodology
We employ a cross-sectional bootstrap methodology to evaluate the performance of Nor-
wegian open-end, domestic equity mutual funds. There are several reasons for why the
bootstrap is necessary for proper inference in this context. These include non-normalities
in individual fund returns as well as non-normalities in the cross-section of mutual fund
alphas. The bootstrap has the advantage that it provides a non-parametric approach to
statistical inference about performance.
Conventional OLS inference relies on the assumption of normally distributed residuals.
There are several properties that would lead to a rejection of the normality assumption
when analyzing mutual fund alphas, making standard parametric test statistics invalid.
First, individual stocks within the typical mutual fund portfolio tend to yield returns with
significantly different skewness and kurtosis compared to a normal distribution. Even
though the central limit theorem implies that a large equally weighted portfolio of non-
normal stocks will approach normality, fund managers usually hold large positions in
some stocks and returns tend to be cross-correlated. Second, individual stocks often
exhibit various levels of serial correlation in returns and tend to have heteroscedastic
variance. Finally, funds may implement dynamic strategies that involve changing their
levels of risk-taking when the risk of the overall market portfolio changes, or in response
to their performance ranking relative to similar funds (Kosowski et al., 2006). As a result,
normality is a poor approximation for the typical mutual fund. Indeed, tests reveal that
normality is rejected for 62% of the funds in our sample using the unconditional four-
factor model of Carhart (1997). By exploring the issue further, we observe that funds in
the extreme region of the performance distribution (i.e. exceptionally good or bad funds)
exhibit even greater skewness and kurtosis than compared to funds closer to the center
of the performance distribution.33 The bootstrap can significantly improve the validity
of inferences about performance, as it does not rely on any distributional assumptions, a
feature particularly important in the extreme regions of the performance distribution.
33We test for normality in the residuals using the Jarque-Bera test at the 5% significance level. For
details on the test results and information on skewness and kurtosis for individual funds we refer to
Appendix E.
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Bickel and Freedman (1984), Hall and Martin (1988), Horowitz (2003), Kosowski et al.
(2006), and Fama and French (2010) all argue that the bootstrap provide more accurate
evaluation of the significance of alpha estimates. Horowitz (2003) conducted Monte Carlo
experiments that demonstrated that the bootstrap could significantly reduce the difference
between the true and nominal probability of correctly rejecting a given null hypothesis.
For example, by recognizing the presence of thick tails in individual fund returns, the
bootstrap does not reject abnormal performance as often as the standard parametric
t-test.
Furthermore, when modelling the cross-sectional distribution of mutual fund residu-
als, one cannot assume normality in this distribution. The cross-sectional distribution
of mutual fund residuals will be a complicated mixture of individual fund distributions
characterized by the following two features: higher moments in individual fund residu-
als and heterogeneous risk taking across funds. Even tough individual distributions of
residuals are normally distributed; it does not necessarily imply that the cross-sectional
distribution of these residuals is normal. To exemplify, consider a selection of funds with
normally distributed residuals, with different levels of risk so that the residual variances
vary uniformly between 0.5 and 1.5 (i.e. the mean variance is 1). Given these assumptions,
the cross-sectional distribution of these residuals will have fatter tails relative to a normal
distribution. To illustrate, as we move further into the tails of the distribution, the prob-
ability of extreme outcomes does not drop as fast as it would have if it had been normally
distributed, since high-risk funds overcompensate for the large drop in extreme outcomes
from low-risk funds (Kosowski et al., 2006). This example shows that the cross-section of
mutual fund residuals can exhibit non-normal behavior regardless of the distribution of
individual funds, as long as risk levels are heterogeneous across funds. Given the complex
nature of modeling the joint distribution across all 98 funds in our sample, the bootstrap
emerges as a very attractive method to analyze a cross-section of mutual funds. In the
next subsection, we will describe the implementation of the bootstrap.
4.2.1 Implementation
We follow the bootstrap method developed by Kosowski et al. (2006). The method involves
residual-only resampling under the null of no outperformance. The implementation of the
bootstrap procedure will be explained in the remainder of this section.
First, for fund i = {1, 2, · · · , N} we estimate the unconditional four-factor model of
Carhart (1997) using OLS (Equation 3), and save the coefficients (i.e. alphas and betas),
alpha t-statistic, and the time-series of the estimated residuals, ˆi,t, t = {Ti0, · · · , Ti1}.
Where Ti0 and Ti1 are the first and last monthly returns available for fund i, respectively.
Next, we draw a random sample (with replacement) from fund i’s residuals ˆi,t to generate
a time-series of resampled residuals, ˜(b)i,t , with the same length as the initial residual vector.
Where b represent an index of the bootstrap number (i.e. b = 1 for bootstrap resample
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number one and so on). The time-series of the resampled residuals are then used in
combination with the factor returns and the estimated beta coefficients to construct a
pseudo time-series of monthly excess returns for fund i, where the fund’s performance
(i.e. alpha) is set to zero by construction (αˆi = 0):
r˜
(b)
i,j = 0 + βˆ1i ·MKTt + βˆ2i · SMBt + βˆ3i ·HMLt + βˆ4i · PR1Y Rt + ˜(b)i,t (5)
The Carhart (1997) four-factor model is then estimated using the pseudo excess return
vector, r˜(b)i,j . If an abnormally high number of positive (negative) residuals are drawn in
a given bootstrap sample, b, a positive (negative) alpha may result. This alpha emerges
as a result entirely due to sampling variation around a true alpha of zero and is entirely
due to luck. For bootstrap simulation 1, the above process is repeated across all funds to
arrive at the first draw from the cross-section of bootstrapped alphas. The bootstrapped
alphas, α˜(1)i {i = 1, 2, · · · , N}, are then ordered from the highest to the lowest α˜(1)max to
α˜
(1)
min. The process is then repeated for b = 10.000 bootstrap simulations to generate a
cross-sectional distribution of alphas, αˆ(b)i {b = 1, 2, · · · , 10.000; i = 1, 2, · · · , N}, resulting
purely from sampling variation around a true alpha of zero (by construction). Percentiles
(points) from this cross-sectional distribution of alphas are used to construct separate
luck distributions for each of the ex-post ranked funds. As an example, the distribution
of alphas for the ex-post top fund (αˆmax) is constructed of the maximum alpha across all
bootstraps (f(α˜max)).34 It is important to note that the alphas in this distribution can be
associated with a different fund for each bootstrap, depending on the outcome of the draw
from each fund’s residuals. This enables us to use valuable information of luck represented
by all the funds in our sample. To infer the existence of inferior or superior managerial skill
we compare any ex-post ranked fund with its appropriate luck distribution. For example,
if we want to examine whether the performance of the ex-post top fund is attributable to
skill or luck, we compare the estimated ex-post alpha for this fund (αˆmax) with its luck
distribution (f(α˜max)).35 If the bootstrap simulations generate far fewer extreme positive
alphas than compared to the ex-post estimated alpha, we conclude that the observed
alpha are not due to sampling variation around a true alpha of zero (i.e. luck), and that
real manageral skill exist.36
In this study we use the t-statistic of the estimated alpha as our performance statistic
rather than alpha as it has some advantageous statistical properties (i.e., it is a pivotal
statistic) when constructing bootstrapped cross-sectional distributions.37 Although the
34To further specify, αˆmax is the estimated ex-post alpha for the top fund while f(α˜max) is the appro-
priate luck distribution for this fund.
35This process can be repeated for any other point in the performance distribution - all the way down
to the bottom ranked fund.
36For the top fund, this requires that only 5% of f(α˜max) is greater than αˆmax (5% confidence level).
37The process involves the same steps as described above. The only difference is that we sort on
t-statistic of alpha instead of alpha.
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estimated alpha quantifies the economic size of abnormal performance, it tends to suffer
from a lack of precision. Short-lived funds (i.e. funds with a small number of observa-
tions) or funds that engage in high levels of risk-taking are likely to have more imprecise
estimated alphas and these alphas may be spurious outliers in the cross-sectional distri-
bution of alphas. The t-statistic normalizes the estimated alpha by its standard error
and inevitably account for differences in risk-taking across funds and different lifespans
of funds. Thus, the bootstrapped distribution of the t-statistic is less dispersed than that
of the alphas.
Furthermore, a small number of observations in the estimation are likely to increase
the sampling variability in the bootstrap results and consequently widen the tails of
the bootstrapped distribution. This could bias the results towards the conclusion that
fund performance is not outside what is expected by mere chance. A way to improve
the precision of the performance estimates is to impose a minimum requirement on the
number of observations for a fund to be included in the analysis. A drawback of this
approach, however, is that it imposes a certain survivorship bias by restricting the sample
to only include funds with a given minimum number of observations. To address this
issue, we assess the sensitivity of the bootstrap results for alternative restrictions on the
minimum number of observations required for a fund to be included in the analysis.
4.3 Empirical Results of Fund Performance
We initiate our analysis on performance by examining the aggregate performance of all
funds in our sample. In the previous sections, we concluded that the unconditional four-
factor model of Carhart (1997) is appropriate to use for mutual fund performance evalu-
ations in the Norwegian market. However, for completeness, we also evaluate aggregate
fund performance using Jensen’s (1968) single-factor CAPM, the three-factor model of
Fama and French (1993) and the conditional version of Carhart’s model. We then turn
to bootstrap simulations to infer the existence of superior and inferior fund managers.
4.3.1 Aggregate Mutual Fund Performance
Table VI below reports estimates from regressions on the equally weighted portfolio of all
funds in our sample using various performance models. The intercepts from the regres-
sions inform us whether funds, on average, produce returns different from those implied
by exposure to common risk factors. Panel A shows that the funds, on average, have
generated a negative yearly alpha of -0.43% measured against the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997).38 The three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) yields a negative
38Measured against the conditional four-factor model, the alpha estimate increases to -0.19%. See
Appendix D for details.
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alpha of -0.57% per year. On the other hand, the estimated alpha from the single-factor
CAPM is positive of 0.39% per year. However, the estimated alphas are not statistically
significant in any of the models. The drop in risk-adjusted performance from the single-
factor CAPM to the multifactor models is mainly attributable to the portfolio’s exposure
to the size (SMB) factor. The SMB factor is the equity benchmark with the highest aver-
age return in our sample period. Further, Panel A shows that the funds, on average, have
a beta exposure close to one against the market (MKT) for all of the factor models. This
result is not surprising considering that our sample consists of funds that invest primarily
in Norwegian equities. By examining the factor loadings, we get an indication of the po-
tential investment strategy the average fund in our sample is following. The positive sign
on the coefficient in front of the SMB factor implies that the average fund tends to favor
small capitalization stocks. The coefficient in front of the value (HML) factor is negative
and significant. Thus, on average, active Norwegian mutual funds show some exposure
to growth stocks. Moreover, the equally weighted portfolio has negative but insignificant
exposure to the momentum (PR1YR) factor.
Panels B and C show that the aggregate performance is best during the first part
of the sample, which is consistent with our previous findings.39 It is important to note
that the fund portfolio changes its exposure to the risk factors quite substantially from
the first part to the second part of the sample. In particular, it becomes evident from
the table that active Norwegian funds, on average, load more heavily on the SMB factor
during the first part of the sample period than compared to the last part. Thus, the
average fund tends to favor small capitalization stocks to a greater extent during the first
part of the sample. Additionally, Table VI shows that the fund portfolio has positive but
insignificant exposure to the HML and PRIYR factors during the first part of the sample
period (Panel B) while the exposure towards these factors turns statistically significant
and negative in the second part of the sample (Panel C). The negative and significant
loading on the PR1YR factor in the second part of the sample indicates that the average
fund follows a contrarian investment strategy during that period.
One might question why the best performance is assigned to the first part of our
sample period. The rationale for this is somewhat unclear, but one explanation might be
that no funds died during the first part of the sample, and that the competition among
funds accelerated throughout the second part. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that the
most successful fund managers over time have turned to more lucrative areas such as
international equity funds, hedge funds or private equity funds. As discussed in Section
1.1.1, the decline in the market share of Norwegian equity mutual funds relative to the
total equity market was indeed quite substantial at the beginning of our sample.
39Table II in Section 3.3 shows that the equally-weighted portfolio of all actively managed Norwegian
mutual funds performs best in the first half of the sample period before adjusting for risk.
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Table VI
Aggregate Fund Performance for Different Sample Periods
The table shows mutual fund alphas for an equally weighted portolio comprising all mutual
fund returns, loadings on the four risk factors of Carhart (1997) for the Norwegian market,
and adjusted R2. The numbers are obtained by conducting time-series regressions by using the
single-factor CAPM of Jensen (1968), the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s
(1997) unconditional four-factor model. Panel A shows the results for the whole sample period
between 1983 and 2014, whereas Panel B (C) shows results from the first (second) half of the
sample. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Numbers assigned stars, ***, **, and *
indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Alphas are reported in percent
per year.
Model α βMKT βSMB βHML βPR1Y R R2Adj
Panel A: 1983:01 - 2014:12
CAPM 0.391 0.965*** 0.923
(0.33) (67.60)
Fama-French -0.569 0.997*** 0.098*** -0.049*** 0.928
(-0.56) (66.07) (4.51) (-2.80)
Carhart -0.428 0.995*** 0.101*** -0.050*** -0.029* 0.929
(-0.33) (66.01) (4.66) (-2.86) (-1.69)
Panel B: 1983:01 - 1998:12
CAPM 1.339 0.910*** 0.911
(0.95) (44.21)
Fama-French -0.463 0.937*** 0.124*** 0.022 0.919
(-0.36) (42.81) (4.36) (0.84)
Carhart -0.421 0.936*** 0.119*** 0.027 0.041 0.919
(-0.55) (42.88) (4.17) (0.99) (1.58)
Panel C: 1999:01 - 2014:12
CAPM -0.840 1.030*** 0.941
(-0.56) (54.93)
Fama-French -1.398 1.038*** 0.068** -0.091*** 0.946
(-1.05) (49.60) (2.22) (-3.84)
Carhart -0.762 1.026*** 0.077** -0.092*** -0.088*** 0.950
(-0.37) (50.43) (2.31) (-4.08) (-3.99)
To examine the time-series dimension of the aggregate mutual fund performance we
report estimates from rolling window and extending window regressions in Figure 3 below.
This allows us to track how the fund portfolio’s alpha estimates have evolved throughout
the entire sample period. Panels A1 and A2 show rolling window and extending window
estimates of the annualized alphas using Jensen’s (1968) single-factor CAPM.40 In Panels
B1 and B2, the single-factor CAPM is replaced by Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model.
From the rolling window estimation in Panel A1, we see that the alphas computed against
the CAPM spikes above zero several times for short intervals during the sample period.
The CAPM alphas are particularly high at one period in the middle of the sample. At
that period, the estimated alphas are also significant at the 5% level for a short while.
40In the rolling window estimation, the window length is set to 36 months. In the extending window
estimation, the estimation window extends from 36 months initially to 384 months.
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Figure 3. Rolling and extending window estimations of the equally weighted port-
folio. This figure plots annualized alpha estimates in percent of the equally weighted portfolio.
The left panels report rolling window estimates of alpha, where the window length is set to
36 months. The right panel reports extending window estimates, where 36 months is used
to estimate the first regression. The top panels show alpha estimates versus Jensen’s (1968)
single factor CAPM, whereas the bottom panels show alpha estimates versus Carhart’s (1997)
four-factor model. The solid line shows the alpha estimate, whereas the dotted line shows the
standard error bands. The sample period is 1983 to 2014.
The four-factor alphas (Panel B1) are more stable compared to the CAPM alphas and
are never significant. Furthermore, from the extending window estimations (i.e. Panels
A2 and B2), we observe that the CAPM alpha is particularly high at the beginning of the
sample period and declines almost monotonically trough time. Conversely, the four-factor
alpha is particularly low at the beginning of the sample period and increases somewhat
through time. Both alpha estimates in the extending window estimations are, however,
not statistically significantly different from zero at any point in time.
One explanation for the relatively high performance spread between the CAPM and
the four-factor model during the earliest part of the sample period may be attributed to
the fund portfolio’s exposure to the SMB, HML and PR1YR factors. Although the CAPM
explains most of the variations in returns, it does not directly control for exposure towards
the SMB, HML and PR1YR factors. From Table VI, we observe that the aggregate fund
portfolio exhibit relatively high exposure towards the SMB factor in the first part of the
sample. Indeed, Table III in Section 3.4 shows that the SMB factor performed particularly
well during that period. This may explain a good proportion of the difference between
the CAPM alpha and the four-factor alpha, especially during the early part of the sample
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period. These implications indicate that the CAPM seems like a poor choice to evaluate
“true” abnormal performance of mutual funds in the Norwegian market, as it fails to
control for exposure towards the SMB, HML and PR1YR factors.
Based on the results, we conclude that active Norwegian mutual fund managers do
not, on average, have sufficient skill to generate returns to cover the costs they impose
on their investors. This outcome may emerge as a result of inferior and superior fund
managers that balance each other out. That is, our sample might consist of both funds
that perform well and funds that perform poorly. In the next section, we turn to individual
fund performance and adapt bootstrap simulations that enable us to distinguish between
skill and luck in individual mutual fund performance.
4.3.2 Individual Funds - Separating Skill from Luck
The tables in Appendix F provides results of regressions on each fund in our sample
using the unconditional four-factor model of Carhart (1997). The tables show that three
funds exhibit significantly positive alphas, whereas five funds exhibit significantly negative
alphas. Given the large number of funds in our sample, it is reasonable to expect that some
funds will perform well and some to perform poorly due to mere chance. The question then
arises, whether the performance of actively managed funds, in fact, is credible evidence of
genuine stock-picking skills, or if it is simply attributable to random chance. Moreover,
are the bad performing funds only a result of bad luck, or is the performance a result of
inferior managerial skill? In this section, our objective is to separate skill from luck in
individual mutual fund performance using a bootstrap approach similar to Kosowski et al.
(2006) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008). As we will see, when compared to the standard
parametric t-test, the bootstrap can provide significantly different results regarding the
significance of mutual fund performance in the tails of the performance distribution.
Table VII below shows the results of the bootstrap simulations where funds are ranked
according to their actual (ex-post) t-statistic of alpha. Row 1 in each panel reports
the actual t-statistic of alpha for funds at different percentile points in the performance
distribution, and Row 2 shows the funds associated alpha estimate. Bootstrapped p-values
of the t-statistics of alphas in Row 1 are reported in Row 3.41 Panel A reports results
from the unconditional four-factor model of Carhart (1997). The top-ranked fund has an
actual t-statistic of alpha of 3.03 and a corresponding yearly alpha of 5.03%.42 However,
the bootstrapped p-value of the t-statistic of alpha is 0.175, indicating that out of the
41The bootstrapped p-values are calculated as follows. Top funds: proportion of bootstrapped alpha t-
statistics > actual t-statistic at each percentile (point). Bottom funds: proportion of bootstrapped alpha
t-statistics < actual alpha t-statistic at each percentile (point).
42One has to bear in mind that the fund returns is net of management fees. Adding back management
fees will push the alpha estimate and the corresponding t-statistic upward. We are, however, unable to
validate fund performance gross of fees since we were unable to obtain data on fee structures dating back
to 1983.
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10 000 bootstrap simulations under the null of no abnormal performance, the bootstrap
generates 17.5% t-statistics of alpha that are greater than 3.03. Thus, we cannot reject
the null that the alpha t-statistic of the top fund may be a result of luck alone. Moving
further to the center of the performance distribution (i.e. the 2nd, 3rd, top 5% and 10%
funds), we see that the t-statistics of alpha remain insignificant under the bootstrap. In
the left tail of the distribution, the bottom ranked fund has an actual t-statistic of alpha
of -3.59 and a corresponding yearly alpha of -14.25%. From Row 3, we see that the
bootstrapped p-value for the bottom fund is 0.036. This indicates that only 3.6% the
bootstrapped t-statistics of alpha is below -3.59. Hence, there is a very small probability
that the bottom-ranked fund could have generated a t-statistic of alpha of -3.59 or higher
(i.e. more negative) by pure chance. Thus, we reject the hypothesis that this fund does
not underperform its benchmarks and conclude that this fund has poor skill. We also find
significant negative abnormal performance that is not attributable to bad luck but is due
to poor skill when we move further to the center of the performance distribution from the
left tail (i.e. the 2nd, 3rd, and bottom 5% and 10% funds).
Table VII
Bootstrap Results of Norwegian Mutual Fund Performance
The table provides results from the cross-sectional bootstrap of Norwegian mutual fund perfor-
mance for the whole sample period from 1983 to 2014. Panel A (B) shows statistics from the
unconditional (conditional) four-factor model of Carhart (1997). Columns 1 to 6 report statistics
for various points and percentiles of the performance distribution, ranging from the worst (bot-
tom) fund to the best (top) fund. Row 1 in both panels reports the actual (estimated) t-statistics
of alpha, whereas Row 2 reports to the associated alpha (annualized) for these t-statistics. The
third row in each panel reports the bootstrapped p-values of the t-statistics of alpha based on
10,000 bootstrap resamples. Funds are ranked on their unconditional and conditional t-statistic
of alpha in Panel A and B, respectively.
Panel A: Unconditional Four-Factor Model
ri,t − rf,t = αi + β1iMKTt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iPR1Y Rt + εit
Bottom
Fund 2
nd 3rd Bottom5%
Bottom
10%
Top
10%
Top
5% 3
rd 2rd TopFund
t-alpha -3.59 -3.20 -3.19 -2.61 -1.93 1.33 1.80 2.37 2.70 3.03
Alpha -14.25 -7.84 -19.32 -6.20 -6.71 2.05 4.90 3.98 6.58 5.03
p-tstat 0.036 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.261 0.091 0.075 0.175
Panel B: Conditional Four-Factor Model
ri,t − rf,t = αi + β1iMKTt + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iPR1Y Rt + Bi,j[Zj,t−1MKTt] + εit
Bottom
Fund 2
nd 3rd Bottom5%
Bottom
10%
Top
10%
Top
5% 3
rd 2nd TopFund
t-alpha -3.25 -3.15 -3.13 -2.36 -1.65 1.39 1.83 2.40 2.74 3.22
Alpha -13.56 -7.91 -20.27 -3.44 -9.99 2.39 3.50 3.77 4.52 5.60
p-tstat 0.091 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.016 0.280 0.220 0.074 0.064 0.104
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Panel B of Table VII reports findings from the conditional four-factor model. It is
evident that including oil price as a conditional variable shifts the performance distribution
slightly to the right. This finding indicates that active Norwegian mutual funds seem to
time the overall market according to the level of the oil price. With the exclusion of the
bottom fund, inferences from the bootstrap are broadly consistent with those from the
unconditional model. There is no evidence of skill in the right tail of the performance
distribution, but with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.09, we can no longer conclude that
the bottom ranked fund has delivered truly inferior performance. When moving further
towards the center of the performance distribution from the left tail, the funds display
poor skill.
As a robustness check of our bootstrap results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that
addresses the potential issue of wide tails in the bootstrapped distribution of alphas
t-statistics caused by the inclusion of funds with a small number of observations. In
the sensitivity analysis, we restrict our sample to include funds with at least 24 and
36 monthly return observations. When imposing a restriction of at least 36 months of
return observations, we find that the bootstrapped p-values for funds in both tails of
the performance distribution drops somewhat but remains insignificant. For details see
Appendix G.
Figure 4 below shows distributions of alpha t-statistics for funds at various percentile
points in the cross-section using the unconditional four-factor model.43 For example,
Panel A1 depicts the bootstrapped distribution of alpha t-statistics for the top-ranked
fund across all bootstrap simulations. The mode of the distribution is about 2.2, but
the distribution is heavily skewed to the right and include alpha t-statistics varying from
around one to, in rare cases, somewhat above 6. Furthermore, Panel A1 shows that
the bootstrap generates too many alpha t-statistics that are greater than the actual (es-
timated) alpha t-statistic of 3.03 for the top-ranked fund to conclude that the actual
(estimated) t-statistic of alpha for this fund is due to genuine stock picking ability. In-
deed, Panel A1 illustrates a case where the standard parametric t-test rejects the null
of no outperformance, while the bootstrap does not. Conversely, Panel B3 illustrates a
situation where the bootstrap rejects the null while the standard t-test does not. These
apparent contradictions are due to the highly non-normal distribution of idiosyncratic
risk across our top and bottom performing funds. Both these cases show that standard
t-tests might give misleading inferences for funds in the extreme tails, and highlight the
importance of a bootstrap when examining the statistical significance in the tails of the
performance distribution, which can have complex distributional properties.
43A similar figure for the conditional four-factor model is reported in Appendix H.
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Figure 4. Actual (estimated) t-statistics of alpha vs. bootstrapped t-statistics of
alpha distributions for individual funds. This figure plots kernel density estimates of the
bootstrapped unconditional four-factor t-statistic of alpha distribution (solid line) for various
percentile points in the cross-section. The x-axis shows the t-statistic of alpha (performance
measure) and the y-axis the kernel density estimate. The vertical dotted line shows the actual
(estimated) fund t-statistic of alpha. Panel A1-A3 (B1-B3) show marginal funds in the right (left)
tail of the performance distribution. For example, “Top 5%” in Panel A2, refers to the marginal
alpha t-statistic at the top 5 percentile of the performance distribution. The bootstrapped
distributions of t-statistics of alpha (under H0 : tˆαˆ = 0) is based on 10,000 bootstrap resamples.
Funds are ranked on their unconditional four-factor t-statistic of alpha, where the highest ranked
fund has the highest t-statistic over the sample period.
To summarize, our bootstrap results suggest no evidence of superior fund management
net of fees. Even for the top fund one would expect t-statistics of alpha at least as high as
the observed ex-post t-statistic of alpha too many times by pure chance to conclude that
this particular fund has genuine stock-picking skill (i.e. the funds performance may be
explained by chance alone). In the left tail of the performance distribution, we find several
funds that exhibit significant and negative t-statistics of alpha that cannot be explained
by bad luck. Thus, our results provide evidence on the existence of a large number of
poorly performing funds in our sample. This is bad news for investors, as it appears to be
very difficult to earn risk-adjusted returns from investing in actively managed Norwegian
mutual funds.
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Although our analysis suggests little evidence of abnormal performance compared to
benchmark returns from Carhart’s (1997) unconditional four-factor model, we find funds
that performed well and were able to generate returns before any risk-adjustments. As
can be observed from the factor loadings on each individual fund in Appendix F, it seems
as if the actual returns generated from these funds can be attributed to beta risk. In other
words, our analysis gives no credit for taking on added systematic risk in terms of betas
that drive the fund portfolios. If it is possible to buy this beta exposure at a lower cost
than the fees imposed by mutual funds is a subject for debate, but it is unlikely that the
average investor is able to form the right combinations and be able to benefit in a similar
way. Thus, a practical implication to investors is that the negative alphas often inferred
by multifactor models does not always imply value destruction, but can merely represent
transaction fees. For sophisticated investors, mutual funds seems to be a preferable option
to gain exposure to certain risk factors (See e.g. Pástor and Stambaugh, 2002a).
5 Persistence in Norwegian Mutual Fund Returns
In the previous section, we found no evidence of superior fund performance among ac-
tively managed Norwegian mutual funds. However, investors might still be able to identify
fund managers who occasionally outperform the market and earn risk-adjusted returns
by exploiting performance persistence. Persistence is also important from an academic
point of view, because evidence of performance persistence would support a rejection of
the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). In efficient capital mar-
kets, evidence of persistence will not occur because all investors are perfectly informed.
Previous studies have, however, found evidence of persistence in U.S. mutual funds.44
To evaluate whether there exist persistence in the performance of actively managed Nor-
wegian mutual funds during the period from 1983 to 2014, we apply some of the most
prominent methods proposed in the academic literature.
5.1 Recursive Portfolio Formation Test
We begin examining performance persistence by using the recursive portfolio formation
approach (See e.g. Hendricks et al., 1993; Grinblatt and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997).
Carpenter and Lynch (1999) argue that the recursive portfolio approach is the most
powerful test to detect performance persistence. In short, this approach involves forming
portfolios of funds based on the fund’s performance over a ranking period and evaluating
how these portfolios perform over a future holding period. The following section provides
an in-depth explanation of our implementation of the method.
44See e.g. Hendricks et al. (1993), Carhart (1997) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2002a) for previous
evidence on long-term persistence. For previous research and evidence on short-term persistene, see e.g.
Bollen and Busse (2005) and Huij and Verbeek (2007).
43
5.1 Recursive Portfolio Formation Test 5
The first step in the recursive portfolio approach is to rank all funds based on their past
M months performance. Previous research indicates that persistence is hard to recognize
if the evaluation period on which the funds are ranked is too long (See e.g. Bollen and
Busse, 2005). Thus, we establish both short and long ranking periods. In our baseline test
we follow Carhart (1997) and rank funds based on their past raw returns, and let M vary
from 1 to 24 months. Carhart (1997) argue that ranking funds based on their past raw
returns has the advantage of allowing for short ranking periods, and has the capability to
avoid potential estimation errors inherent with ranking on risk-adjusted returns. On the
other hand, raw returns might not be an adequate measure of real investment skill since
they are affected by different investment styles such as growth or value, the portfolio’s
risk level, and managerial skill as well as luck (Lückoff, 2011). If managerial skill exists,
raw returns might be a noisy measure. To get a better representation of true investment
skill, we also perform the recursive portfolio tests were we use the four-factor alpha and
four-factor t-statistic of alpha as ranking measures. The drawback of using risk-adjusted
return as ranking measures, however, is that we need a sufficient number of observations
to estimate the four-factor model properly. This puts a limitation on how short we can
keep the evaluation period on which the funds are ranked. For this reason, we let M vary
from 24 to 36 months when funds are ranked on past four-factor alpha and four-factor
t-statistic of alpha. The top performing funds in the ranking period are placed in the
winner portfolio (Top quintile), and the worst performing funds are placed in the loser
portfolio (Bottom quintile).45 These portfolios are then held over N months before they
are rebalanced according to the new historical M month performance. We let N vary
from 1 to 24 months for all ranking measures. The monthly return for each quintile
portfolio is the cross-sectional average return of all funds in the specific portfolio. This
procedure is repeated until the end of the sample to construct a concatenated post-ranking
time series for each quintile portfolio. Funds that disappear during the evaluation period
due to mergers or liquidations are included in their respective equally-weighted quintile
portfolio until their last monthly return observation, and then the portfolio weights are
readjusted accordingly using the remaining alive funds to avoid any potential look-ahead
bias. Finally, we estimate the four-factor alpha of the quintile portfolios, where the
statistical significance is evaluated using the bootstrap method described in Section 4.2.
Table VIII below reports the results when funds are ranked on the basis of their
past raw returns. In general, we evaluate persistence by looking at the top (Panel A)
and bottom (Panel B) quintile portfolios. In addition, we construct a hypothetical self-
financing portfolio (Panel C) that is long in prior winners and short prior losers (i.e.
top quintile minus the bottom quintile). By looking at Panel A in the table, we find
45We order the portfolios by means of quintiles in contrast to Carhart (1997) who use deciles, since the
average number of funds in our sample is considerably smaller. In our sample, the top (bottom) quintile
contains the twenty percent best (worst) performing funds, et cetera.
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no significant evidence of persistence amongst winner funds. This implies that investors
cannot look to past performance to generate positive risk-adjusted returns in the near
term, i.e. we find no presence of “Hot hands” in the Norwegian mutual fund industry.
This result is in line with previous research conducted with the use of monthly data (See
e.g. Sørensen, 2009a; Carhart, 1997). Furthermore, we observe that when the holding
period increases, winner funds generate more frequent negative risk-adjusted returns.
Specifically, it can be seen from Panel A that with a 12-month ranking period and a
holding period of 12 months, the top quintile portfolio yields a negative yearly alpha that
is not significantly different from zero. This finding is consistent with Sørensen (2009a).
Table VIII
Performance of Top, Bottom and Spread Portfolios Formed on Lagged Returns
This table reports annualized monthly alphas based on the unconditional four-factor model of
Carhart (1997) for the top quintile portfolio (Quintile 1) in Panel A, for the bottom portfolio
(Quintile 5) in Panel B and for a spread portfolio long in quintile 1 and short in quintile 5 in Panel
C using different lengths of ranking and holding periods. Explicitly, the respective portfolios are
ranked according to past (3-36 months) raw returns, and held for different evaluation periods (1-
24 months). The portfolios are then rebalanced accordingly, and the process repeated throughout
the entire sample. Panel A (B) reports the top (bottom) quintile containing the top (bottom)
20% funds, whereas Panel C reports the spread between these quintiles. Columns 2 - 6 refer to
holding periods of 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24, respectively. Rows 1 - 5 refer to rankings based on prior
3, 6, 12, 24, and 36 month raw returns. Significance is validated by employing the bootstrap
approach as described in Section 4.2. Numbers assigned stars, ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Holding Period
Ranking Period 1 3 6 12 24
Panel A: Top Quintile
3 0.46 0.64 0.13 -1.12 -1.07
6 1.06 0.29 -0.18 -0.91 -0.91
12 0.46 0.38 0.11 -1.15 -1.24
24 -0.72 -1.42 -1.25 -0.95 -1.03
36 -0.16 -0.61 -0.14 0.06 -0.64
Panel B: Bottom Quintile
3 -2.29** -2.24** -1.79* 0.45 0.51
6 -2.42** -1.39 -1.34 -0.39 -0.14
12 -3.17*** -3.08*** -2.54** -0.84 0.02
24 -2.19** -1.95** -1.69* -1.44 -1.24
36 -1.94** -2.07** -1.74* -1.50 -1.41
Panel C: Spread Portfolio
3 2.75** 2.88** 1.92* -1.57* -1.58*
6 3.48*** 1.68* 1.15 -0.52 -0.77
12 3.63*** 3.46*** 2.65** -0.31 -1.26
24 1.47* 0.53 0.43 0.48 0.21
36 1.78* 1.46* 1.60* 1.56* 0.77
Panel B reports risk-adjusted return for loser funds (i.e. funds belonging in the bottom
quintile). We find significant evidence of short-term persistence among losers. Specifically,
when the funds are held for one month, we find significantly negative alphas for all ranking
periods. For example, monthly rebalancing based on past 12 months raw returns yields
a negative yearly alpha of -3.17% on average, which is significant at the 1% level. The
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magnitude of the estimated alpha drops monotonically with increasing holding periods
but remain significant for holding periods up to six months. This is consistent with the
“Icy hands” phenomenon of Hendricks et al. (1993), which implies that poorly performing
funds in an initial period continue to be inferior performers in the near term.
Moreover, as can be observed from Panel C in the table, we find evidence of significant
risk-adjusted return on the hypothetical self-financing spread portfolio.46 Specifically, us-
ing one-month holding periods based on the funds’ prior 12 month performance yields
a winner-minus-loser spread of 3.63% on average, which is statistically significant at the
1% level. The alpha decreases with longer holding periods but remains statistically sig-
nificantly different from zero for holding periods up to six months. For longer holding
periods, the positive risk-adjusted returns turn negative and statistically indistinguishable
from zero
As previously mentioned, raw returns might not be an adequate measure of real in-
vestment skill. Ranking funds on their risk-adjusted returns (i.e. alpha or t-statistic of
alpha) not only controls for risk but in the case of multifactor models also controls for
differences in style exposures. In addition, ranking funds based on risk-adjusted returns
should make it easier to distinguish between skilled and unskilled but lucky fund managers
(See e.g. Elton et al., 1996a; Bollen and Busse, 2005). All things considered, we employ
the same recursive portfolio test by using both risk-adjusted returns from the four-factor
model (i.e. alpha) and the corresponding alpha t-statistic as ranking measures.
Tables IX and X below report results from the recursive portfolio test when funds are
ranked into quintiles based on their past alpha and t-statistic of alpha, respectively. The
tables suggest no evidence of performance persistence amongst past-winner funds when
funds are ranked on risk-adjusted returns, which is in line with our previous findings.
Furthermore, it can be seen from Table IX (i.e. when funds are ranked on past alpha)
that past losers stay losers for holding periods up to six months for both ranking periods.
By looking at Panel A, we find a negative alpha of -3.24% per year with monthly rebal-
ancing. The magnitude of the alpha estimate decreases monotonically with the length of
the holding period but stay statistically significantly negative for holding periods up to
six months. This result holds for both ranking periods. When funds are ranked on past
t-statistics of alpha (i.e. Table X), past-losers stays losers for holding periods up to three
months. For longer holding periods, the estimated alpha becomes statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. This result also holds for both ranking periods. The magnitude of
the alpha estimates when funds are ranked on past t-statistic of alpha is analogous to
the alpha estimates when funds are ranked on past alpha. Moreover, by comparing these
results with the results in Table VIII above, we find that the results are mostly in line, but
46The portfolio is only hypothetical because short-selling shares in Norwegian mutual funds is not possi-
ble. It is self-financing because it represents a trading strategy of going long in prior winners and shorting
prior losers. Results from this spread portfolio are still interesting, however, as it exposes interesting dis-
similarities between extreme funds (i.e. the top and bottom performers).
46
5.1 Recursive Portfolio Formation Test 5
the magnitude of the alpha estimates increases somewhat when ranking is based on alpha
or t-statistic of alpha. Overall, these results strengthen the evidence of no dependable
performance persistence among winner funds, and further supporting the presence of “Icy
hands” in the Norwegian mutual fund industry.
Furthermore, Tables IX and X show that hypothetical spread portfolio yields signifi-
cantly positive alphas for holding periods up to three months when funds are ranked based
on their past alpha or t-statistic of alpha. This result holds for both ranking periods and
is in contrast to our findings when funds are ranked on the basis of their past raw returns
(i.e. Table VIII). From Table VIII, we do not find significant alphas for any of the holding
periods when the evaluation period on which the funds are ranked is 24 or 36 months.
As we mentioned earlier, raw returns might be a noisy measure, and does not reflect true
investment skill. Thus, we consider rankings based on past alpha and t-statistic of alpha
to be more reliable.
Table IX
Performance of Quintile Portfolios Formed on Lagged Alpha
This table reports annualized alphas and bootstrapped p-values from the unconditional four-
factor model of Carhart (1997) for each individual quintile portfolio (1 to 5), and for the spread
portfolio portfolio long in quintile 1 and short in quintile 5 using different lengths of ranking and
holding periods. In Panel A (B), the respective portfolios are ranked according to past 36 (24)
months alpha, and evaluated using different holding periods (1 - 24 months). The process is
repeated throughout the entire sample period. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 refer to alpha estimates
with respect to 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months holding periods, respectively. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and
10 report the bootstrapped p-values of the alpha estimates.
1 Month 3 Month 6 Month 12 Month 24 Month
Quintile Holding period Holding period Holding period Holding period Holding period
Portfolio α p-value α p-value α p-value α p-value α p-value
Panel A: 36 Month Ranking Period
Top 20% -0.39 0.371 -0.19 0.433 -0.15 0.448 0.03 0.492 0.05 0.487
2nd 0.80 0.236 -0.14 0.460 -0.94 0.211 -0.98 0.200 -1.46 0.112
3rd 0.51 0.304 0.63 0.272 0.48 0.332 -0.01 0.505 0.45 0.317
4th -1.82 0.083 -2.30 0.051 -1.95 0.082 -1.30 0.171 -0.73 0.307
Bottom 20% -3.24 0.002 -2.33 0.020 -1.93 0.047 -1.30 0.172 -1.05 0.234
Spread 2.85 0.016 2.13 0.025 1.78 0.066 1.33 0.160 1.10 0.215
Panel B: 24 Month Ranking Period
Top 20% 0.16 0.441 -0.61 0.278 -0.42 0.364 -0.35 0.392 -0.43 0.349
2nd -0.27 0.397 0.20 0.418 0.33 0.385 -1.18 0.127 0.23 0.409
3rd -0.19 0.421 0.41 0.362 -0.51 0.309 -0.27 0.394 -0.82 0.219
4th -1.34 0.168 -1.37 0.167 -1.75 0.103 -0.63 0.279 -1.52 0.134
Bottom 20% -2.24 0.022 -2.18 0.029 -2.02 0.041 -1.55 0.124 -0.80 0.269
Spread 2.40 0.019 2.07 0.034 1.33 0.137 1.20 0.178 0.37 0.357
Taken together, with the exception of the hypothetical spread portfolio, we get rather
consistent results by applying different ranking measures. Based on results from the
recursive portfolio formation tests, we conclude that there exists no persistence in perfor-
mance among recent top performers, even when portfolio rebalancing is frequent. This
implies that investors cannot identify superior performance ex-post and use this informa-
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tion to earn risk-adjusted returns. In contrary, we find that performance among the worst
performing funds strongly persist for short time-periods, indicating the presence of “Icy
hands” in the universe of Norwegian mutual funds. Furthermore, our results suggest that
it is possible to create a trading strategy that entails buying past winners and shorting
past losers based on ex-post performance information, which yields positive risk-adjusted
returns. However, for the average investor, shorting mutual funds seems like an impossible
task. In addition, this strategy requires frequent portfolio rebalancing, which in a real-
istic scenario will impose substantial transaction costs. Thus, the economic implication
of this finding is questionable. Overall, with the exception of winner funds, our results
are consistent with Bollen and Busse (2005) who conclude that post-ranking abnormal
returns largely disappears when funds are evaluated over longer periods, suggesting that
persistence is a short-lived phenomenon. In the next section, we conduct non-parametric
two-period tests to assess whether there are funds in our sample that perform consistently
better or worse relative to other funds in our sample.
Table X
Performance of Quintile Portfolios Formed on Lagged t-stat of Alpha
This table reports annualized alphas and bootstrapped p-values from the unconditional four-
factor model of Carhart (1997) for each individual quintile portfolio (1 to 5), and for the spread
portfolio portfolio long in quintile 1 and short in quintile 5 using different lengths of ranking and
holding periods. In Panel A (B), the respective portfolios are ranked according to past 36 (24)
months alpha t-statistic, and evaluated using different holding periods (1 - 24 months). The
process is repeated throughout the entire sample period. Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 refer to alpha
estimates with respect to 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months holding periods, respectively. Columns 2,
4, 6, 8 and 10 report the bootstrapped p-values of the alpha estimates.
1 Month 3 Month 6 Month 12 Month 24 Month
Quintile Holding period Holding period Holding period Holding period Holding period
Portfolio α p-value α p-value α p-value α p-value α p-value
Panel A: 36 Month Ranking Period
Top 20% 0.07 0.476 0.04 0.483 0.06 0.482 0.00 0.498 -0.26 0.404
2nd 0.23 0.416 -0.33 0.390 -0.18 0.436 -0.45 0.337 -0.44 0.355
3rd 0.20 0.435 0.32 0.393 -0.31 0.393 -0.35 0.382 -0.07 0.480
4th -0.99 0.203 -1.82 0.061 -2.19 0.041 -0.92 0.221 -1.17 0.176
Bottom 20% -3.52 0.001 -2.77 0.011 -1.81 0.066 -1.72 0.068 -1.69 0.072
Spread 3.59 0.004 2.80 0.009 1.87 0.059 2.05 0.052 1.43 0.124
Panel B: 24 Month Ranking Period
Top 20% 0.20 0.431 -0.31 0.382 -0.30 0.389 -0.09 0.464 0.03 0.479
2nd -0.27 0.413 0.38 0.357 0.48 0.361 0.32 0.377 -0.96 0.191
3rd -0.16 0.436 -0.71 0.281 -0.81 0.272 -1.16 0.158 -1.47 0.110
4th -1.62 0.095 -1.52 0.101 -0.76 0.294 -1.09 0.216 -2.32 0.024
Bottom 20% -2.27 0.031 -2.12 0.037 -1.28 0.153 -0.38 0.368 0.67 0.285
Spread 2.07 0.039 1.91 0.049 0.98 0.189 0.30 0.378 -0.63 0.264
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5.2 Non-Parametric Two-Period Tests
Despite that we did not find any positive risk-adjusted performance persistence among
top performing funds, we cannot conclude that there is no persistence among these funds.
Even though these funds delivered negative risk-adjusted returns, they might exhibit
superior performance relative to the sample. In this section, we turn to non-parametric
two-period tests that allow us to investigate persistence relative to the average mutual
fund industry (i.e. whether some funds perform consistently better or worse compared to
other funds in the sample).
5.2.1 Consistency in Ranking
Following Carhart (1997), we investigate the consistency in fund ranking by constructing
contingency tables of initial and subsequent fund rankings. Specifically, we rank funds
based on their past raw return and place them in quintiles over an initial and subsequent
time window. Then, we count the number of times a fund ends up in one of the quintiles
in the subsequent period, conditional on its ranking over the initial period. Funds that
disappear during the subsequent period are placed in a separate category for dead funds.
Consistency in rankings is then evaluated by looking at the conditional probability of
achieving a subsequent ranking of quintile j (or dying) given its initial ranking of i. We
construct contingency tables for four different time windows of 3, 6, 12, and 24 months,
respectively. The contingency tables are illustrated in Figure 5.
From the figure, it becomes apparent that losers are more likely to remain losers. This
can be seen from the relatively large contingent probabilities that the worst performing
(bottom quintile) funds will remain in the bottom quintile. This is in line with our
previous findings, thus further supporting the premise of persistence among loser funds
and the presence of “Icy hands” among active Norwegian mutual funds. In addition, it
can be observed from Figure 5 that the probability of disappearing from the database
(i.e. to be placed in the bar for dead funds) is highest for funds initially placed in the
bottom quintile, and it decreases almost monotonically with initial ranking. This is best
illustrated in Panels A and B of the figure (i.e. time windows of 24 and 12 months).
Further, from Panel D (i.e. time windows of three months), it is evident that prior
winners are more likely to become next period’s winners. Interestingly, it can be seen
from the figure that the contingent probability for winners to remain winners decreases
monotonically with the time window. Thus, the figure provides evidence of short-term
persistence among winner funds before adjusting for risk. Furthermore, it becomes evident
from the figure that last periods winners frequently become next period’s losers and
vice versa. This is consistent with the typical gambling behavior among mutual funds
(Carhart, 1997).
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Figure 5. Contingency tables over two subsequent intervals. The figure depicts consis-
tency in rankings over two consecutive periods; initial and subsequent rankings. Panel A - D has
different length of time windows, that is, 24, 12, 6 and 3 months respectively. The top (worst)
performing funds are placed in Quintile 1 (5). Funds that have died during the sample period
are placed in a separate bar for dead funds. The bars in the figure represent the conditional
probability of achieving a subsequent rank j (or dying) given its initial ranking i. The sample
period is 1987 to 2014.
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5.2.2 The Cross-Product Ratio
The contingency tables in Figure 5 provide a visual representation of persistence in our
sample, but do not inform us about the statistical significance of the results. In this
section, we perform a cross-product ratio (CRP) test to evaluate whether there exist
persistence in our sample. In contrary to the first non-parametric test, the CRP test
quantifies the statistical significance of persistence. Following Brown and Goetzmann
(1995), we categorize funds as winners (W) if the funds’ return for a given period is
greater than the median in that same period. Conversely, a loser fund (L) is labeled if
the funds’ performance is lower than the median. Funds that are categorized as winners
(losers) over an initial period and subsequent period are denoted WW (LL). If a fund is
categorized as a winner (loser) in the first period and as a loser (winner) in the second
period, the fund is denoted WL (LW). The cross-product ratio captures the odds ratio of
the funds that show persistence in performance relative to other funds in the sample that
do not. That is, the number of repeated performers to the number of those that do not
repeat. The cross-product ratio (CPR) is defined as follows:
CPR = WW · LL
WL · LW (6)
The null hypothesis in the cross-product ratio test is that there is no persistence, i.e. that
WW, LL, WL, and LW has equal probability. That is, the performance in the initial
period is unrelated to the performance in the subsequent period, which corresponds to a
CPR of one. The statistical significance of the CPR can be evaluated using the standard
error of the natural logarithm of the CPR (See e.g. Christensen, 1990). The resulting
Z-statistic is the ratio of the natural logarithm of the CPR to the standard error of the
natural logarithm:
Z = ln CPR
σlnCPR
= ln CPR√
1
WW +
1
WL +
1
LW +
1
LL
(7)
We also use the Chi-square statistic to evaluate the statistical significance of our results as
a robustness check. Carpenter and Lynch (1999) argue that the Chi-square test based on
the number of winner and loser funds is well specified and powerful, and that it specifically
proves to be more robust to the presence of survivorship bias. We compute the Chi-square
statistic similar to Agarwal and Naik (2000):
χ2 = (WW −D1)
2
D1 +
(WL−D2)2
D2 +
(LW −D3)2
D3 +
(LL−D4)2
D4 , (8)
where
D1 = (WW +WL) · (WW + LW )/N, D2 = (WW +WL) · (WL+ LL)/N
D3 = (LW + LL) · (WW + LW )/N, D4 = (LW + LL) · (WL+ LL)/N,
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and N denotes the total number of observations. Table XI below reports the CPR and
the corresponding z-statistic in addition to outputs from the Chi-square test for various
time periods. From the table, we find statistically significant evidence of performance
persistence in line with our previous findings for time windows up to six months. It
should be be noted that the CPR is also above one for time windows of 12 months, but
this result is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Furthermore, the CPR below one
when using time windows of 24 months point toward reversed performance persistence,
i.e. prior winners are expected to lose in the following period. Similar to the results from
the contingency tables in the previous section, we find that the statistical significance of
performance persistence decreases as the time windows increases. Overall, this sensitivity
to the return measurement interval strengthens the evidence of short-term persistence
among Norwegian mutual funds.
Table XI
Persistence Results from the Cross-Product Ratio Test
The table reports the cross-product ratio (CPR), the corresponding Z-statistic and Chi-square
statistic. Row 1 reports the CPR, whereas Row 2 (3) reports the Z-statistic (Chi-square statis-
tic). Columns 1-4 refer to different return measurement periods with time windows of 3, 6, 12,
and 24 months, respectively. Numbers assigned stars, ***, **, and * indicates significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is 1987 to 2014.
3 Month 6 Month 12 Month 24 Month
Time Window Time Window Time Window Time Window
CPR 1.36 1.31 1.09 0.80
Z-statistic 5.33*** 3.20*** 0.68 -1.21
χ2-statistic 28.51*** 10.23*** 0.47 1.46
To conclude our analysis on persistence, we find no evidence of dependable performance
persistence when adjusting for risk among top-performing active mutual funds in the
Norwegian market. Our results imply that investors cannot exploit past performance to
earn positive risk-adjusted returns, a result which coincide with the semi-strong form of
the EHM. On the other hand, we find significant short-term persistence among loser funds.
Interestingly, this is the most consistent conclusion that can be found in all major studies
on performance persistence, and indicate that following a contrarian investment strategy
of buying last year’s losers to gain positive risk-adjusted returns is a long shot. The results
are robust for various ranking and holding periods, and regardless of whether the funds
are ranked on the basis of past raw return, four-factor alpha or four-factor t-statistic of
alpha. In the non-parametric two-period tests, we find further support for the premise
of persistence among loser funds. However, these tests also reveal persistence among
prior winners in subsequent periods for short time windows. This effect diminishes as the
time window increases. The fact that we only find persistence for short time horizons is
consistent with Bollen and Busse (2005) who argue that persistence is, if any, a short-lived
phenomenon.
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6 Asymmetries in Norwegian Mutual Fund Perfor-
mance
So far, based on the analyses in previous sections, we have found no empirical evidence of
abnormal performance in Norwegian equity mutual fund returns. Kosowski (2011) argue
that the premium investors are willing to pay for an asset is driven by the covariance of
the assets payoff with marginal utility. Moreover, he suggests that investors more will-
ingly pay premiums for assets that are negatively correlated with consumption. When
we have economic contractions in the business cycle (i.e. recessionary states in the econ-
omy), consumption tends to be particularly low (See e.g. Breeden, 1979; Rubinstein, 1976;
Grossman and Shiller, 1981). The practical implications to investors based on Kosowski’s
(2011) arguments, is that if a given asset performs poorly in recessions when the investor
is poor, the asset is less attractive than assets that perform well in non-recessions when
consumption is high (and the investor feels wealthy).
In general, there is mostly good news about firms during economic upturns. In line
with the semi-strong form of market efficiency, most news about companies is revealed
accordingly during non-recession periods, and information about companies is relatively
symmetrically distributed in the market. As a consequence, the variance of information
signals tends to be low throughout non-recessionary states in the economy (Kosowski,
2011). During economic downturns when there is more bad news, however, corporate
managers tend to withhold information. This leads to asymmetric information and thus
higher variance of information signals in the market. This hypothesis is supported by
Kothari et al. (2009), who suggest that corporate managers withhold bad news, but
immediately leak and reveal positive news. In other words, there should be reason for
fund managers to possibly be better informed in recessions, because of the higher variance
of information signals. Thus, under these assumptions, there is more potential to possibly
outperform passive benchmarks during recessionary states. The question then arises,
whether mutual funds in fact are able to perform particularly well during such recessionary
states in the economy when the marginal utility of wealth is high, and performance really
matters.
In the proceeding sections, we aim to answer a hitherto unanswered question in the
Norwegian fund sector. That is, if Norwegian equity mutual funds perform well in reces-
sionary states in the economy when performance matters the most to investors. To answer
this hypothesis, we explicitly examine aggregate fund performance in different states of
the business cycle using a binary classification of recession and non-recessionary dates in
the Norwegian economy. Additionally, we apply a novel conditional performance mea-
surement methodology based on a Markov Regime-Switching Model following Kosowski
(2011), where we let the data determine the indicator of the states in the business cycle.
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The remainder of this section proceeds as follows. First, we explicitly investigate
aggregate fund performance using sub-periods based on a binary classification of Nor-
wegian recession and non-recession periods. Then, we discuss advantages of the Markov
regime-switching Model and describe the theoretical foundation of regime-switching per-
formance measures. Finally, we integrate the regime-switching framework in our analysis
on asymmetries in Norwegian mutual fund performance.
6.1 Norwegian Business Cycle Reference Dates
Following Burns and Mitchell (1946), we define business cycles as fluctuations in aggregate
economic activity. This is the classic way to define business cycles, at which peaks and
troughs describe developments in the level of economic activity across different sectors in
the economy. Contractions (i.e. recessions) start at the peak of a business cycle, and end
at the through. The periods from through to peak are considered to be non-recessions,
i.e. periods in time with up-and-coming growth. Alternatively, one could refer to business
cycles as “growth cycles”, where the economic fluctuations in the cycle is defined relative
to trend growth. That is, “high” or “low” growth characterize the business cycle to be
above (non-recession) or below (recession) the estimated trend. The classical business
cycle approach is advantageous since there is no need to model unobserved trend growth.
The most widely used reference point in business cycle literature is the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER). Based on available data (i.e. not normally revised), The
Business Cycle Dating Committee of NBER decides when a turning point occurs, and
provides specific dates (monthly) on when US business cycle recessions starts and ends.
Since these decisions are made after much deliberation on the basis of available data, the
announcements of the turning points are often made as late as one year after the actual
turning point took place.
Most of the previous US literature that analyses asymmetries in fund returns use
NBER dates. These dates, however, are not representable for the Norwegian economy
(See e.g. Christoffersen, 2000). There exist several studies on Norwegian business cycles,
but these papers conduct analyses primarily on growth cycles (See e.g. Eika and Lindquist,
1997; Bjørnland, 2000; Bjørnland et al., 2008). Since there is no official dating of classic
business cycle dates in Norway, we turn to the only two papers to our knowledge that
date Norwegian business cycle turning points by using classic programmed approaches
similar to NBER.
Several research papers have been able to almost identically replicate the NBER re-
cession dates by using programmed approaches. Specifically, these papers use the Bry-
Boschan algorithm for programmed determination of turning points (See e.g. Bry and
Boschan, 1971; Artis et al., 1995). Christoffersen (2000) use the same approach following
Bry and Boschan (1971), and define turning points to four Nordic countries; Denmark,
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Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The study of Christoffersen (2000), however, use unre-
vised data on industrial production for each country. In Norges Bank Occasional Papers,
Aastveit et al. (2014) conducts research that considers revised data. The employ a similar
programmed approach as Bry and Boschan (1971) to date and forecast business cycle ref-
erence dates in Norway on the basis of Norwegian mainland GDP. It is important to note
that GDP growth rates typically fluctuate around a higher level and are more persistent
during non-recession periods. They stay at a relatively low lever, however, and are less
persistent during recessions. For such data, it would not be reasonable to expect a single,
linear model to capture these distinct behaviors, thus a programmed approach is more
preferable. We consider the study of Aastveit et al. (2014) to be the most consistent and
similar to the dates published by NBER, and apply these dates in our empirical analysis
in the following sections as basis for comparison. Areas shaded in grey in Figure 6 below
present dates at which recessions occur in our sample period from 1983 to 2014.
Figure 6. Norwegian Business Cycle Reference Dates. The figure plots cumulative
returns for the equally weighted portfolio of all funds and the OSE All Share index for recession-
ary and non-recessionary periods in Norway. The Norwegian business cycle reference dates are
obtained from Aastveit et al. (2014), and are represented by the areas in gray. The solid line
plots mean returns for the equally weighted portfolio (i.e. returns of all funds that existed at
some point over the sample period), whereas the dotted line plots mean returns for the OSEAX.
6.2 Empirical Results of Fund Performance in Recession and
Non-Recession Sub-Periods
Based on the Norwegian business cycle reference dates defined in the previous section,
we construct two separate sub-samples for recession and non-recession periods. Before
we explicitly evaluate risk-adjusted fund performance in recession and non-recessions, we
provide some summary statistics for the two sub-samples.
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6.2.1 Summary Statistics in Recession and Non-Recession Periods
Table XII below reports summary statistics for the equally weighted portfolio excess
return and equity benchmark returns for the whole period as well as recession and non-
recession sub-periods. Panel A reports means and standard deviations, whereas Panel
B reports skewness and kurtosis. From Panel A, we see that the mean return on the
fund portfolio and the market proxy (MKT) are statistically significantly higher in non-
recession periods than in recession periods. Furthermore, Panel A shows that the size
(SMB) and momentum (PR1YR) factor perform better in non-recessions, whereas the
book-to-market (HML) factor-mimicking portfolio benchmark performs best in recessions.
Table XII
Descriptive Statistics of Benchmarks and Mutual Fund Returns in Recessions and
Non-Recession Periods
The table provides summary statistics for benchmark returns (i.e. the four risk factors from
Carhart’s (1997) model), and excess returns for the equally weighted portfolio comprising all
funds in our sample. Panel A displays first and second moments, i.e. mean and standard devi-
ation. Panel B reports higher order moments, i.e. skewness and kurtosis. In all Panels, values
are reported for both recessions, non-recessions, and the full sample, respectively. Dates on
recessions and non-recessions are obtained from Aastveit et al. (2014). Means and standard
deviations are annualized and reported in percent, whereas the remaining statistics are reported
monthly. ’***’, ’***’ and ’*’ represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance of the difference between
recessionary and non-recessionary means. The sample period is 1983 to 2014.
Panel A: First and Second Moments
Mean Standard Deviation
Full Sample Recessions Non-Recessions Full Sample Recessions Non-Recessions
EW(All) 7.06 -11.38** 8.97 21.90 33.94 20.24
MKT 6.94 -11.57** 8.86 21.80 35.59 19.83
SMB 9.81 1.65 10.66 15.32 18.91 14.91
HML 4.41 16.83* 3.12 17.20 17.61 17.13
PR1YR 9.03 5.77 9.37 16.94 19.97 16.63
Panel B: Higher Order Moments
Skewness Kurtosis
Full Sample Recessions Non-Recessions Full Sample Recessions Non-Recessions
EW(All) -0.81 -0.94 -0.56 4.92 3.75 4.00
MKT -0.92 -1.04 -0.58 5.31 3.71 4.06
SMB 0.47 0.57 0.48 6.31 2.83 7.06
HML -0.13 -0.44 -0.11 4.17 2.84 4.36
PR1YR -0.40 -1.05 -0.29 4.32 4.90 4.10
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Figure 7 below plots the annualized mean excess return of the equally weighted fund
portfolio and the equity benchmarks over the recessions and non-recession periods in our
sample. Panel A of the figure shows that the fund portfolio reach a through in each
recession period, where the latest recession (the Global Financial Crisis). From Panel
B and C, we observe that the market proxy and the momentum factor follow the same
pattern as the fund portfolio. Also the size-mimicking portfolio follows a similar cycle,
except for performing particularly well in the 2001 recession. Conversely, the mean return
of the book-to-market mimicking portfolio peaks in all recessions period. This finding is
in line with Lakonishok et al. (1994) who find that value strategies outperform growth
strategies in bad states of the economy. Overall, these results are consistent with Kosowski
(2011) who find similar patterns on mean returns of the equity benchmarks in Carhart’s
(1997) four-factor model in NBER recession and non-recession sub-periods. Based on this
findings, we will in the next section, assess how active Norwegian mutual funds change
their exposure to the equity benchmarks between recession and non-recession periods.
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Figure 7. Mean excess returns for Norwegian mutual funds and equity benchmarks
during recessions and non-recession periods. The figure plots annualized mean excess
return for the equally weighted portfolio of all funds and equity benchmarks for recessionary
and non-recessionary periods during 1983 - 2014. Panel A reports mean excess return for the
equally weighted portfolio. Panel B shows the three risk factors in Fama-French’s (1993) model,
MKT, SMB, and HML. Panel C reports the one-year return momentum factor of Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993). The x-axis displays recessions (R) and non-recession (E) periods, whereas the
y-axis refer to the excess returns in percent per year.
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In addition, it is evident from Panel A in Table XII that the standard deviations of
the fund portfolio and the market proxy are substantially higher in recession periods.
The volatility of the other equity benchmarks is fairly stable across recession and non-
recession periods, but is slightly higher in recessions for all equity benchmarks. Figure 8
below plots the annualized standard deviation over recessions and non-recession periods
and confirm these findings. From Panel A and B, it is apparent that both mutual fund
and market return volatility peaks in every recession in our sample. The volatility of
the other benchmarks is fairly stable around 20% per year in both recession and non-
recessions. Furthermore, Panel B of Table XII reports skewness and kurtosis, and we
observe only minor differences between recessions and non-recession periods. On average,
all of the return series except from the SMB are negatively skewed, and they exhibit
relatively high kurtosis. These results apply to the full sample, as well as for recessionary
and non-recessionary periods.
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Figure 8. Standard deviation of excess returns for Norwegian mutual funds and
equity benchmarks during recessions and non-recession periods. The figure plots
annualized standard deviations of excess returns for the equally weighted portfolio of all funds
and equity benchmarks for recessionary and non-recessionary periods during 1983 - 2014. Panel
A reports standard deviation of excess return for the equally weighted portfolio. Panel B shows
the three risk factors in Fama-French’s (1993) model, MKT, SMB, and HML. Panel C reports
the one-year return momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The x-axis displays
recessions (R) and non-recessions (E) periods, whereas the y-axis refer to the standard deviations
in percent per year.
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6.2.2 Risk-Adjusted Performance in Recession and Non-Recession Periods
In this section, we investigate the performance of Norwegian funds in Norwegian reces-
sion and non-recession sub-periods. Risk-adjusted Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas and
beta loadings for the equally weighted fund portfolio in recession and non-recession sub-
periods as well as the full sample period is reported in Table XIII below. The table
shows that Norwegian mutual funds, on average, perform better in recessions compared
to non-recession periods. Actively managed Norwegian mutual funds, on average, deliver
a positive yearly alpha of 0.26% in recessions and a negative yearly alpha of -0.87% in
non-recession periods. However, none of the estimated alphas are statistically significant.
The adjusted R-squared is high in recession periods (95%), implying that the model ex-
plains most of the variation in returns. Hence, making it unlikely that a missing factor is
causing the higher alpha in recession periods.
Table XIII
Risk-Adjusted Performance in Recession and Non-Recession Periods
This table reports risk-adjusted mutual fund performance based on the unconditional Carhart
(1997) four-factor model for the full sample period (1983 to 2014), and recession and non-
recession sub-periods. Dates on the recessionary and non-recessionary sub-periods are obtained
from Aastveit et al. (2014). The alpha (α) is based on excess returns of the equally weighted
portfolio comprising all funds in our sample. The table also reports regression coefficients (β’s)
for the factors in Carhart’s (1997) model, MKT, SMB, HML and PR1YR, respectively. Columns
1, 3, and 5 report the regression coefficients, whilst Columns 2, 4, and 6, report their respective
t-statistics (numbers in parentheses). The two bottom rows refer to the annualized residual SD
and adjusted R2. Numbers assigned stars, ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Full Sample Recessions Non-Recessions
α -0.428% (-0.30) 0.262% (0.06) -0.870% (-0.79)
MKT 0.995*** (65.99) 0.882*** (16.31) 1.011*** (62.60)
SMB 0.101*** (4.67) -0.056 (-0.54) 0.111*** (5.11)
HML -0.050*** (-2.85) -0.023 (-0.32) -0.050*** (-2.98)
PR1YR -0.029* (-1.62) -0.163** (-2.44) -0.011 (-0.59)
σεannual. 5.82 7.15 5.54
R2Adj. 0.93 0.95 0.92
An examination of the beta loadings in recession and non-recession periods reveals
that actively managed Norwegian mutual funds, on average, reduce their exposure to
the market-, size- and momentum factors in recession periods, while they increase their
exposure (i.e. less negative) to the value factor in recession periods. As we observed
from Table XII, the market-, size-, and momentum benchmarks perform best in non-
recession periods, whereas the book-to-market mimicking portfolio performs better in
recession periods. Thus, the changes in beta loadings on the equity benchmarks between
recession and non-recession periods can be interpreted as evidence of positive market
timing regarding all benchmark factors. However, portfolio betas can change as a result
of changes in the betas of the underlying assets comprising the portfolio. Betas tend to
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change during economic downturns. Thus, our evidence of positive market timing must
be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, fund managers appear to stay away from high-
risk small firms by reducing their exposure to the size factor in high volatility states. This
result is consistent with a flight to quality tendency typically caused by uncertainty in the
financial markets.47
Table XIII also reports the standard deviation of the residuals in recession and non-
recession periods. We see that the residual standard deviation is higher in recession
periods than in non-recession periods. This is important evidence that would be used
to identify the recessionary and non-recessionary states in the Markov regime-switching
models in proceeding sections. As we will show later, one of the characteristics of the
recession state in the Markov regime-switching models is that it is always the state with
the highest volatility.
6.3 The Markov Regime-Switching Model
The Markov Regime-Switching model was first introduced by Hamilton (1989) and was
developed as a tool for dealing with infrequent, but recurrent and endogenous shifts
between regimes (or states) in time series data. One of the advantages of the model
is that it allows for the involvement of multiple equations that characterize time-series
behaviors in different regimes, and is permitting switching between these equations. This
enables the model to capture more complex dynamic patterns. The switching mechanism
between the equations (or regimes) is controlled by an unobservable state (latent-state)
variable that is assumed to follow a first-order Markov chain.
Regime-switching models have several advantages over alternative techniques to cap-
ture structural breaks in data because the parameters in the model are not conditioned
on pre-defined state indicators.48 Instead, the model allows for a continuous time interval
with state transition probabilities that contains information on the direction of variations
on mutual fund returns (Kosowski, 2011). Binary classifications also fail to capture peri-
ods of economic growth slowdowns in the economy (Chauvet and Potter, 2000), which can
be properly modelled in a Markov regime-switching model. Additionally, the binary clas-
sifications might have its own measurement issues, and only become available “after the
fact” (Kosowski, 2011). Even more complex models, for example Kalman filter models,
are not able to estimate mutual fund performance in recessions and non-recession periods
directly, without being combined with binary indicators.
47A flight to quality is the act of moving capital away from “risky” investments and toward “safer”
investments due to uncertainty about the overall economy.
48Such as dummy variables.
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6.3.1 The Regime-Switching Framework
In the following sections, we discuss the Markov regime-switching model that forms the
basis of our empirical analysis. We follow Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2001) and
Kosowski (2011), who use the original specification purposed by Hamilton (1989) but
generalize the model to let the intercept term, regression coefficients and the variance
term to be regime dependent. Specifically, we allow for two possible regimes, a recession
and a non-recession regime, in the Carhart (1997) unconditional four-factor model, and
let the identity of these regimes be determined by the data. This allows us to explicitly
control for state dependencies in fund’s alpha and beta risk and link fund performance
to recession and non-recession states. The regime-switching framework combines a set of
equations into one system. The system allows the regression coefficients in each equation
to be state dependent. For the unconditional four-factor model of Carhart (1997), the
system can be specified as follows:
ri,t−rf,t = αi,St +β1i,St ·MKTt+β2i,St ·SMBt+β3i,St ·HMLt+β4i,St ·PR1Y Rt+εi,t (9)
where St is a latent state variable that can take on two possible values (i.e. St = 1, 2).
The state variable St is unobserved and is assumed to follow a first order Markov process
so that:
Pr(St = i|St−1 = j) = pii,j, i, j = 1, 2. (10)
The value pii,j is the transition probability of moving to state i from state j. These transi-
tion probabilities are usually assumed to stay constant over time, but it is also possible to
allow them to be time-varying (i.e. depend upon some predetermined variables). In the
model, αi,St and β
′
i,St represent the mutual funds’ performance and beta risk, respectively.
The alphas and betas are discrete random variables that can take two values, and is de-
pendent on the state of the economy. Since fund managers may have different information
sets in recessionary and non-recessionary states, alphas and betas may be different in the
two states.
6.3.2 Transition Probabilities
Previous empirical evidence with Markov regime-switching models argue that the flexi-
bility gained by allowing the state transition to vary over time as a function of a vector
of predetermined variables, zt−j, can be very substantial (See e.g. Filardo, 1994; Diebold
et al., 1994; Durland and McCurdy, 1994; Gray, 1996; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann,
2000). Following Kosowski (2011), we thus establish our regime-switching model by using
time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP), and make the usual assumption that the
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state transition probabilities follow a first-order Markov chain:
pt = Pr(St = 1|St−1 = 1, zt−j) = p(zt−j) (11)
1− pt = Pr(St = 2|St−1 = 1, zt−j) = 1− p(zt−j) (12)
qt = Pr(St = 2|St−1 = 2, zt−j) = q(zt−j) (13)
1− qt = Pr(St = 1|St−1 = 2, zt−j) = 1− q(zt−j) (14)
The candidate series for the predetermined information variables are those considered to
be useful to predict business cycles. We follow Filardo (1994), Perez-Quiros and Tim-
mermann (2000), and Kosowski (2011) who use the Composite Leading Indicator as the
variable for the state transition in the model. The CLI measure is designed to pro-
vide qualitative information on short-term economic movements and as such represent a
forward-looking indicator about the future evolution of the economy.49 The logistic index
function for the state transitions can be expressed as follows:
pt = Pr(St = 1|St = 1) = φ(c1 + d1(∆CLIt−2)) (15)
qt = Pr(St = 2|St = 2) = φ(c2 + d2(∆CLIt−2)) (16)
where φ(·) is the cumulative density function of a standard normal variable, ∆CLIt−2 is
the two month lagged change in the composite leading indicator and cs is a constant. For
completeness, we also estimate the Markov regime-switching model with constant transi-
tion probabilities, and briefly comment on the differences. The logistic index function for
the model with constant transitions only contains a constant:
pt = Pr(St = 1|St = 1) = φ(c1) (17)
qt = Pr(St = 2|St = 2) = φ(c2) (18)
The transition probabilities together with the other parameters in Equation 9 can be
estimated recursively by maximum likelihood if assumptions are made on the density
of the innovations εi,t.50 Appendix I provides a description of the likelihood function
used to estimate the parameters. This approach estimates means of both alpha and
beta coefficients, variance and the transition probabilities for both recessionary and non-
recessionary states. Hence, it allows us to connect fund performance explicitly to the
state of the business cycle, and provide answers on how Norwegian equity mutual funds
perform in recession and non-recessionary states of the economy.
49Return-series on the OECD CLI for Norway from 1983 to 2014 is obtained from OECD Statistics
webpage.
50In this study, we assume that the innovations are Gaussian.
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6.3.3 Markov Regime-Switching Models of Mutual Fund Alpha
Given the advantages of the regime-switching model outlined in Section 6.3, we now
examine the performance of Norwegian funds in recessions and non-recession periods using
this forward-looking latent state approach and find that the results are mostly in line with
our previous findings. As previously discussed, we estimate two models. The first model
assumes constant state transition probabilities, whereas the second model allows the state
transition probabilities to vary over time with changes in the Composite Leading Indicator.
Table XIV below reports maximum likelihood estimates of the Markov-switching models
in addition to the single-state model.
Model I (fixed transition probabilities) and Model II (time-varying transition proba-
bilities) in Table XIV confirm our findings based on the Norwegian recession periods that
the recession alpha is higher than the non-recession alpha. The estimated yearly alpha
is positive of 0.33% and 0.43% in recession periods and negative of -1.19% and -1.46%
in non-recession periods in Model I and Model II, respectively. The alpha estimates are,
however, not statistically significant in any state in any of the models. From the log-
likelihood values, we see that by allowing the state transition probabilities to vary over
time with the two-month lagged change in CLI, the in-sample fit of the model increases.
The recession state is identified by three pieces of evidence. First, the transition
probability coefficients, d1 and d2, have opposite signs in the time-varying transition
probability specification (Model II). Hence, the transition probabilities, pt and qt move in
the opposite direction when CLIt−2 fluctuates. Although not significant, the signs in front
of d1 and d2 are intuitively plausible. The economic interpretation of the coefficients is that
as CLI decreases the probability of being and staying in State 1 (non-recessions) decreases
while the probability of being and staying in State 2 (recessions) increases. Second, we
find that the residual volatility is higher in State 2 for both models. The higher residual
volatility in State 2 represents the higher uncertainty regarding the predictive power of
the model in State 2. From economic theory, one could expect the recessionary state to
be more volatile than the non-recessionary state, and consequently we can expect a higher
residual volatility in recession periods compared to non-recession periods. This premise
is supported by Schwert (1990) and Hamilton and Lin (1996) who find that stock return
volatility is highest during economic recessions. The higher residual volatility is consistent
with our findings in Table XIII in Section 6.2.2. Third, in the fixed transition probability
specification (Model I), State 2 is less persistent (p22 = 0.84) than State 1 (p11 = 0.96).51
52 This is consistent with Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) and Ang and Bekaert
(2002) who find that the high volatility state is also the less persistent state.
51p11 is the probability that the process will stay in State 1 at time t+ 1 given that the process was in
State 1 at time t. The same intuition applies to p22.
52p11 = 11+exp(−3.196) = 0.96; p22 =
1
1+exp(−1.625) = 0.84
63
6.3 The Markov Regime-Switching Model 6
Table XIV
Regime-Switching Estimates of Carhart’s (1997) Four-Factor Alpha
This table reports regime-switching estimates of fund performance based on Carhart’s (1997) four-factor
model. The table includes estimates when regime-switching is applied on two-state models using both
fixed transition probabilities (Model I) and time-varying transition probabilities (Model II). Rows 1 to 5
report mean parameters, which includes alpha (in percent per year) and the four risk factors in Carhart’s
model, MKT, SMB, HML, and PR1YR. Row 6 reports variance parameters in percent per month, and
Rows 7 and 8 report the transition probability parameters. Row 9 show the log-likelihood estimates of
each three models. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The sample period
is 1983 to 2014. The following regime-switching Carhart (1997) four-factor model is estimated for the
equally-weighted portfolio of all funds:
ri,t − rf,t = αi,St + β1i,St ·MKT + β2i,St · SMBt + β3i,St ·HMLt + β4i,St · PR1Y Rt + εi,t
where εt ∼ N(0, σst)
Column 1 reports single state estimates, whereas Columns 2 (Model I) and 3 (Model II) report estimates
in the two states. The transition probabilities in model I are fixed, and the time-varying transition
probabilities in Model II depend on the two month lagged change in the Composite Leading Indicator
∆CLIt−2:
Model I: pt=Pr(St=1|St−1=1)=φ(c1), qt=Pr(St=2|St−1=2)=φ(c2)
Model II: pt=Pr(St=1|St−1=1)=φ(c1+pi1∆CLIt−2), qt=Pr(St=2|St−1=2)=φ(c2+pi2∆CLIt−2)
where φ(.) is the cumulative density function of a standard normal variable
Single State Model Model I Model II
Mean Parameters State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Alpha (in pct p.a.) -0.428 -1.193 0.332 -1.457 0.429
(-0.33) (-1.13) (0.63) (-1.51) (0.87)
MKT 0.995*** 1.002*** 0.967*** 1.001*** 0.970***
(-66.44) (66.08) (14.97) (69.36) (15.89)
SMB 0.101*** 0.074*** 0.180** 0.078*** 0.163**
(4.69) (3.56) (2.16) (3.90) (2.31)
HML -0.050 -0.063*** -0.004 -0.064*** -0.005
(-2.88) (-3.88) (-0.04) (-3.89) (-0.07)
PR1YR -0.029 -0.017 -0.067 -0.010 -0.082
(-1.61) (-0.69) (-0.87) (-0.52) (-1.27)
Variance Parameters
S.D. (in pct. p.m.) 1.678*** 1.181*** 2.935*** 1.175*** 2.910***
(113.14) (52.78) (28.73) (68.22) (31.73)
Transition Probability
Parameters
cs 3.196*** 1.625*** 3.301*** 1.694***
(4.77) (2.96) (5.69) (3.31)
pis∆CLIt−2 0.295 -0.051
(1.30) (0.22)
Log Likelihood 1022.2 1062.8 1065.7
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Moreover, consistent with our previous findings, the regime-switching estimates show
that actively managed Norwegian mutual funds, on average, reduces their exposure to
the market factor in recessionary periods.53 The regime-switching estimates also confirm
our previous findings regarding the funds’ loading on the momentum factor and the value
factor, which is higher (lower) on the value (momentum) factor in recessions. Hence, these
results provide further evidence of positive timing regarding the market, value and mo-
mentum factor. However, the regime-Switching estimates imply that Norwegian mutual
funds increase their exposure to small firms during recessionary periods. This is in con-
trast to our regression results in Table XII using Norwegian recession and non-recession
sub-periods, and in contrast to a flight to quality tendency often observed in bear mar-
ket.54 This may indicate bad timing in regards to the size factor. However, as stated
before, these results should be interpreted with caution given the fact that portfolio betas
can change as a result of changes in the betas of the assets comprising the portfolio.
Our findings are robust to different factor models as Appendix J shows. The alpha
remains insignificant and positive in recessions, and insignificant and negative in non-
recessions regardless of whether alpha is defined with respect to the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model or the single-factor CAPM.
6.3.4 Statistical Tests for Asymmetries
One of the crucial tests in Markov Regime-Switching models concerns the number of states
that best characterize the data. Unfortunately, tests for the number of states cannot be
performed with the common likelihood ratio test (LRT) because, under the null of a single
state, state transition probabilities are unidentified nuisance parameters and standard
results on the distribution of LRT no longer apply. Various methods to overcome this
problem have been proposed in the literature (See e.g. Boldin, 1990; Hansen, 1992; Garcia,
1998). Hansen (1992) suggest a Monte Carlo method to derive the asymptotic distribution
of the regression coefficients under the null. However, given the number of parameters that
needs to be estimated in our model, this approach will quickly run into computational
limitations. We therefore follow Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) and Kosowski
(2011) and test for asymmetries in the conditional mean condition on the existence of two
states in the conditional volatility and vice versa. The resulting LRT follows a standard
chi-squared distribution. Panel A and Panel B in Table XV below reports the outcome
of the tests for identical mean and identical variance using Model II, respectively.55 We
reject the null of symmetry in both the conditional mean and conditional volatility. These
results confirm that asymmetries are statistically significant.
53Implied by a lower beta loading on the market proxy in recession periods.
54This is a result of letting the Markov Swithcing Model define the high-volatility recessionary states,
which is different from that of Aastveit et al. (2014).
55These results also hold for Model I.
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Table XV
Likelihood Ratio Tests for Identical Mean and Variance across States in the
Markov Regime-Switching Model
The table reports the results of the likelihood ratio tests for equality of parameters across the
two states in the Markov Regime-Switching model (Model II). Panel A reports the outcome
of the test for identical mean parameters, which assumes that there are two states in the
conditional variance. Panel B reports the outcome of the test for identical variance parameters,
which assumes that there are two states in the conditional mean. In both panels, Row 1 (2)
reports the unrestricted (restricted ) log-likelihood value, whereas Rows 3 and 4 report the
likelihood ratio test statistic (LRT) and p-value. The LRT statistic is based on the chi-squared
distribution with m degrees of freedom, where m is the number of restrictions. The sample
period is 1983 to 2014. The following regime-switching Carhart (1997) four-factor model is
estimated for the equally-weighted portfolio of all funds:
ri,t − rf,t = αi,St + β1i,St ·MKT + β2i,St · SMBt + β3i,St ·HMLt + β4i,St · PR1Y Rt + εi,t
where εt ∼ N(0, σst)
pt=Pr(St=1|St−1=1)=φ(c1+pi1∆CLIt−2), qt=Pr(St=2|St−1=2)=φ(c2+pi2∆CLIt−2)
Panel A: Test for Identical Means
EW (All Funds)
Unrestricted Log-Likelihood 1065.697
Restricted Log-Likelihood with
(αst=1=αst=2 and βq,st=1=βq,st=2, q={1,2,3,4}) 1060.026
LRT Statistic 11.342
p-value (LRT) 0.045
Panel B: Test for Identical Variance
EW (All Funds)
Unrestricted Log-Likelihood 1065.697
Restricted Log-Likelihood with
(σst=1=σst=2) 1053.999
LRT Statistic 23.396
p-value (LRT) 0.000
6.4 Interpretation of Results and Economic Importance
Our results above suggest some evidence of asymmetries in the performance of actively
managed Norwegian equity funds. Specifically, based on our Markov regime-switching
model with time-varying transition probabilities we find a difference in risk-adjusted per-
formance (alpha) of 1.89% between recession and non-recession periods. Differences in
risk-adjusted performance between recession and non-recession periods are robust to the
binary classification of Norwegian recession dates based on Aastveit et al. (2014).56 How-
ever, even though statistical tests provide evidence of asymmetries in Norwegian mutual
fund returns, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the alpha in recession and non-recession
periods is individually statistically different from zero. Despite the lack of statistical sig-
56We use Aastveit et al. (2014)’s binary classification of recession dates to construct two separate
sub-samples for recession and non-recession periods and estimate the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
on the separate sub-samples.
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nificance, we find that the signs on the alpha estimates are in line with Kosowski (2011)
who conduct the same analysis on US data. That is, Norwegian mutual fund man-
agers show some tendencies to perform better in recessions when performance matters
the most to investors, and that the documented underperformance appears to stem from
non-recessionary periods when information are relatively symmetrically distributed in the
market.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the performance, persistence, and business cycle asymmetries in
Norwegian mutual fund returns using a dataset free of survivorship bias containing 98
active Norwegian mutual funds with net monthly returns from 1983 to 2014. We use
the unconditional four-factor model of Carhart (1997) as our primary performance model
and examine mutual fund performance both at the aggregate and the individual level.
Due to non-normalities in the return residuals, we adapt a bootstrap approach similar to
Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French (2010) and Cuthbertson et al. (2008) to evaluate
the statistical significance of our results.
We find that actively managed Norwegian mutual funds on aggregate produce returns
that underperform the four-factor benchmark net of costs. This implies that if the average
fund manger in fact possesses superior skill, they do little beside collect fees. When we
study individual funds, our bootstrap simulations suggest no evidence of superior fund
mangers. On the contrary, we find credible evidence of inferior performing funds in the
left tail of the performance spectrum. We reject the hypothesis that the bad performance
among the worst performing funds is due to bad skill.
To evaluate whether there exists persistence in the performance, we employ several
reputable parametric and non-parametric statistical tests adapted from previous litera-
ture. Tests for persistence reveals no evidence of risk-adjusted performance persistence
among the top quintile portfolio of funds. The lack of evidence of persistence in perfor-
mance among top-performing funds is bad news for Norwegian mutual fund investors, as
investors cannot look at past performance to earn positive risk-adjusted returns. How-
ever, among the bottom quintile portfolio of funds, we find that performance strongly
persists for time horizons up to six months before it largely disappears. These results are
robust to rankings based on returns, alpha and t-statistic of alpha. Additionally, we find
positive abnormal performance on a hypothetical spread portfolio, which consist of a long
position in the top quintile portfolio and a short position in the bottom quintile portfolio.
Specifically, buying last years top quintile portfolio and selling last years bottom quintile
portfolio yields a yearly alpha of 3.63% if funds are ranked on the past 12 months return
and held for one month before the portfolios are rebalanced. The economic implication
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7of this finding is, however, questionable, as investors cannot easily short mutual funds.
Additionally, the strategy entails frequent portfolio rebalancing, which would most cer-
tainty impose substantial transaction costs. Our series of non-parametric two-period tests
reveals evidence of persistence amongst both winner and loser funds relative to other funds
in the Norwegian market for time windows up to six months. Overall, our results are in
line with Bollen and Busse (2005) who argue that post-ranking abnormal returns largely
disappear when funds are evaluated over longer holding periods.
Finally, we investigate potential asymmetries in the performance of the aggregated
portfolio of actively managed Norwegian mutual funds. Specifically, we aim to link fund
performance to bad and good states of the economy, using two different methodologies.
The first approach is based on a binary classification of recession periods in Norway. The
second approach involves a Markov regime-switching framework, where we let the data
determine the indicator of the different states in the economy. We find that managers of
active Norwegian funds indeed show some indications to perform better in recessionary
periods when performance matters the most to investors. Statistical tests show evidence
of asymmetries in the returns of actively managed mutual funds, but we cannot explicitly
reject the hypothesis that the recession alpha is statistically significantly different from
zero. In economical terms, we find that the difference in alpha between recession and
non-recession periods is 1.89% based on our Markov regime-switching model with time-
varying transition probabilities. Differences in alpha between recession and non-recession
periods are robust to the binary classification of recessions in Norway.
The general consensus in the existing literature on mutual fund performance is con-
firmed by the empirical results in our study. As previously emphasized, active manage-
ment is not justified from an academic point of view because it would violate the efficient
market hypothesis. Our results make it hard to disagree. The puzzle why investors keep
investing in actively managed mutual funds still remain unanswered, but our results on
asymmetric performance provide some important insight into a possible answer.
All taken together, it seems like Norwegian mutual fund investors are better of by
investing in passively managed low-cost funds, as managers of active Norwegian mutual
funds do little besides collecting fees. At the very least, our results show that Norwegian
mutual fund investors should stay away from past losers.
Interesting avenues for further research could be to investigate the performance of
Norwegian funds with international investment mandates. As illustrated in Figure 1, this
category of mutual funds has experienced considerable growth during the past twenty
years. To our knowledge, there has been conducted no research on the performance of
this category of mutual funds. A major challenge on this subject, however, is to choose
appropriate benchmarks. Additionally, previous research suggests that in- and outflows
of funds could have severe impact on mutual fund performance (See e.g. Berk and Green,
2004; Lückoff, 2011). We leave these questions for further research.
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Appendix A
Table A.I
Mutual Fund Database Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics of our mutual fund database. Column 1 shows the number
of funds available to investors at the end of each year. The second (third) columns show how
many funds that are born (liquidated) each year. Column 4 reports annualized returns on an
equally weighted portfolio comprising all funds each year, whereas Column 5 reports returns on
the OSEAX benchmark. Returns are reported in percent.
Number of funds Returns
Year Year-end Born Liquidated EW (All) OSEAX
2014 54 0 6 7.86 3.33
2013 60 3 4 21.78 21.19
2012 61 1 1 15.29 11.23
2011 62 4 0 -19.86 -8.17
2010 58 2 0 22.00 16.71
2009 55 0 0 58.16 46.54
2008 55 0 0 -66.05 -63.95
2007 55 0 2 12.04 13.53
2006 57 3 6 27.12 30.41
2005 60 1 4 39.23 44.46
2004 63 1 2 32.26 34.59
2003 64 2 3 45.14 41.74
2002 65 7 4 -38.88 -26.48
2001 62 4 6 -14.63 -11.86
2000 64 7 3 4.36 3.57
1999 60 3 3 45.05 42.09
1998 60 12 0 -32.73 -27.97
1997 48 9 0 29.44 26.74
1996 39 7 0 35.25 24.24
1995 32 7 0 15.97 11.75
1994 25 8 0 4.96 8.72
1993 17 1 0 57.64 52.84
1992 16 4 0 -13.37 -7.11
1991 12 2 0 -8.24 -6.85
1990 10 3 0 -17.12 -11.60
1989 7 0 0 49.02 46.90
1988 7 0 0 27.97 33.87
1987 7 1 0 -3.01 -4.82
1986 6 0 0 -5.49 -8.21
1985 6 1 0 19.26 28.66
1984 5 0 0 37.19 24.47
1983 5 3 0 73.50 68.11
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Appendix B
Figure B.1. Monthly risk-free interest rate from 1983 to 2014. The figure plots the
annualized one-month interest rate for the period 1983 to 2014. For the period between 1983 and
1986, the overnight NIBOR rate is used. Between 1986 and 2014, the figure plots the one-month
NIBOR interbank rate.
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Appendix C
Following Elton et al. (1996b), we estimate the magnitude of survivorship bias in the per-
formance (i.e. alpha) between surviving funds and all funds in our sample. If survivorship
bias is present, excluding non-surviving (i.e. dead) funds in the sample data will yield
unrealistically high estimates of the aggregate mutual fund performance. Specifically,
we divide the sample into all funds (98), surviving funds (54) and non-surviving funds
(44). Non-surviving funds are included in the sample until their last monthly observation,
upon which the fund was liquidated or merged with another fund. Then, we estimate the
potential bias imposed by restricting our sample to include surviving funds only by es-
timating the difference between the performance of surviving and non-surviving funds.
It is evident from Table C.I below that the aggregate performance is biased upwards if
we were to include surviving funds only, regardless of which performance model we use.
The table shows that the aggregate fund portfolio delivers neutral performance by only
including surviving funds, which indicates a survivorship bias of 0.428% per year when
measuring against Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model.
Table C.I
Survivorship Bias
The table presents alphas for all funds (Column 1), surviving funds (Column 2), and non-
surviving funds (Column 4) in our sample. The alphas are estimated by using Jensen’s (168)
single-factor CAPM, Fama-French’s (1993) three-factor model, and the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997). The estimated bias in Column 3 is the difference in the average performance
between surviving funds and all funds. Alphas are annualized and reported in percent. The
sample period is 1983 to 2014.
All Funds Surviving Funds Bias Dead Funds
CAPM 0.391 0.801 0.410 -0.810
Fama-French -0.569 -0.214 0.355 -1.633
Carhart -0.428 0.000 0.428 -1.257
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Table D.I
Aggregate Fund Performance Using the Conditional Four-Factor Model
The table report regression results on the equally weighted portfolio comprising all funds in our sample using different versions of the conditional
four-factor model. Column 1 reports the annualized alpha, whereas Columns 2 - 5 reports the four unconditional variables included in the models,
MKT, SMB, HML, and PR1YR. Columns 6 - 8 reports regression coefficients of the three information variables included in the conditional models
(i.e. Models I, II, and III), being the yield on the oil price, industrial production growth, and market return, respectively. The conditional variables
are lagged one month. The final column reports the adjusted R-squared. Row 4 reports estimates from the unconditional model for comparative
purposes. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Numbers assigned stars, ***, **, and * indicates significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is 1983 to 2014.
Unconditional Variables Conditional Variables
α MKT SMB HML PR1YR Oil Pricet−1 Industrial Productiont−1 MKTt−1 R2Adj
Model I -0.186 0.996*** 0.101*** -0.051*** -0.028* -0.025* 0.929(-0.17) (66.04) (4.68) (-2.91) (-1.65) (-1.73)
Model II -0.509 0.998*** 0.102*** -0.050*** -0.029* 0.005 0.929(-0.46) (65.89) (4.71) (-2.84) (-1.67) (1.07)
Model III -0.614 0.999*** 0.099*** -0.051*** -0.029* 0.022* 0.929(-0.56) (65.77) (4.60) (-2.88) (-1.65) (1.65)
Unconditional Carhart -0.428 0.995*** 0.101*** -0.050*** -0.029* 0.929(-0.33) (66.01) (4.66) (-2.86) (-1.69)
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Table E.I
Descriptive Statistics on Individual Mutual Funds (1/2)
The table shows descriptive statistics on all individual Norwegian mutual funds in our mutual
fund database. Column 1 reports the number of monthly return observations in each fund,
whereas yearly excess returns, skewness and kurtosis are reported in Columns 2 - 4. Column 5
reports outputs from the Jarque-Bera test, where a value of 1 (0) implies rejection (no rejection)
of normality on a 5% level. The estimates are constructed by running regressions on each
individual fund from 1983 to 2014.
Name Obs Return Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
ABIF Norge ++ 55 3.01 -0.59 4.50 1
Alfred Berg Aksjefond Norge 112 1.34 -0.47 5.98 1
Alfred Berg Aksjespar 105 0.75 -0.22 3.42 0
Alfred Berg Aktiv 228 9.70 0.24 4.65 1
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 180 4.80 0.21 4.12 1
Alfred Berg Gambak 251 11.46 0.10 3.21 0
Alfred Berg Humanfond 180 4.44 0.31 3.28 0
Alfred Berg N. Pensjon 204 6.44 -0.13 3.55 0
Alfred Berg Norge Classic 195 6.72 -0.26 4.02 1
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk 290 5.20 0.18 2.78 0
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 144 8.41 -0.01 3.75 0
Alfred Berg Norge + 51 7.71 0.14 3.35 0
Alfred Berg Vekst 69 1.54 1.18 6.89 1
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class A 48 7.79 -0.23 2.43 0
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class B 49 10.58 -0.22 2.49 0
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class D 22 15.46 0.62 2.95 0
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class I 49 10.51 -0.19 2.49 0
Atlas Norge 202 7.29 1.43 11.43 1
Banco Norge 36 8.83 0.03 2.31 0
Carnegie Aksje Norge 233 9.71 0.05 7.03 1
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesforvaltning A 19 23.21 -0.77 3.69 0
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 176 10.51 0.48 5.13 1
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 97 8.61 0.42 4.83 1
Danske Invest Norge I 251 7.16 0.04 3.95 1
Danske Invest Norge II 251 6.61 -0.02 4.29 1
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 251 9.69 2.00 14.17 1
Delphi Norge 245 12.04 -0.18 4.34 1
Delphi Vekst 191 6.67 -0.19 3.70 0
DNB Norge 232 6.06 0.25 5.56 1
DNB Norge (Avanse I) 285 5.76 -0.27 3.75 1
DNB Norge (Avanse II) 374 5.23 0.14 4.72 1
DNB Norge (I) 284 3.48 -1.03 13.22 1
DNB Norge (III) 226 6.48 -0.24 4.61 1
DNB Norge (IV) 145 13.04 -0.47 5.50 1
DNB Norge Selektiv 224 8.62 0.14 3.61 0
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 155 9.32 0.04 3.12 0
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) 246 7.52 -0.19 5.51 1
DnB Real-Vekst 150 -4.50 -0.16 4.11 1
DNB SMB 165 10.33 0.26 3.04 0
Eika Norge 135 12.94 -0.47 4.52 1
Eika SMB 185 4.08 0.09 3.29 0
Fokus Barnespar 30 -8.15 -1.03 4.58 1
Fondsfinans Aktiv II 46 -7.05 -0.21 2.95 0
Fondsfinans Norge 144 15.96 0.15 5.32 1
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Table E.II
Descriptive Statistics on Individual Mutual Funds (2/2)
Name Obs Return Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
FORTE Norge 46 0.61 -0.13 2.55 0
FORTE Trønder 20 11.23 0.34 2.33 0
GAMBAK Oppkjøp 17 -3.40 -0.17 2.21 0
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar 150 1.02 0.65 7.23 1
GJENSIDIGE Invest 102 7.95 -0.20 4.25 1
Globus Aktiv 88 7.19 -0.27 3.84 0
Globus Norge 103 -0.10 -0.34 4.11 1
Globus Norge II 95 4.28 -0.33 4.10 1
Handelsbanken Norge 238 8.78 -0.15 4.86 1
Holberg Norge 35 7.50 0.37 2.62 0
K-IPA Aksjefond 168 7.18 0.15 2.87 0
KLP Aksjeinvest 95 -0.85 0.07 4.43 1
KLP AksjeNorge 189 8.39 0.18 3.41 0
Landkreditt Norge 103 6.65 0.43 4.81 1
Landkreditt Utbytte 22 10.02 -1.52 5.02 1
NB-Aksjefond 205 4.96 -0.24 4.60 1
Nordea Avkastning 375 4.02 -0.73 7.80 1
Nordea Barnespar 45 -11.09 0.59 5.39 1
Nordea Kapital 237 9.86 -0.27 5.56 1
Nordea Kapital II 82 8.92 -0.85 6.65 1
Nordea Kapital III 68 7.81 -0.90 6.27 1
Nordea Norge Pluss 44 5.46 -0.52 3.56 0
Nordea Norge Verdi 226 8.73 -0.31 3.98 1
Nordea SMB 211 1.15 0.01 4.72 1
Nordea SMB II 68 -23.54 -0.44 3.74 1
Nordea Vekst 377 4.20 -0.25 7.35 1
ODIN Norge 270 12.03 1.17 7.72 1
ODIN Norge II 127 6.04 -0.02 3.15 0
Orkla Finans 30 155 11.61 0.21 3.90 1
Pareto Aksje Norge 159 12.30 0.30 3.27 0
Pareto Aktiv 147 11.69 0.32 3.36 0
Pareto Investment Fund A 360 6.21 0.40 6.92 1
Pareto Verdi 216 4.05 0.38 6.11 1
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforvaltning) 108 6.92 0.02 2.77 0
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforvaltning) 239 8.61 -0.28 4.64 1
Postbanken Aksjevekst 95 1.82 0.86 4.91 1
RF Aksjefond 114 6.02 -0.49 3.62 1
RF Plussfond 52 15.21 -0.05 2.49 0
SEB Norge LU 66 -12.24 -0.10 3.25 0
Skandia Horisont 95 7.98 1.42 7.36 1
Skandia SMB Norge 95 -9.52 -0.29 5.22 1
Storebrand Aksje Innland 221 4.63 -0.92 5.96 1
Storebrand AksjeSpar 219 6.09 0.28 6.49 1
Storebrand Norge 375 6.06 0.00 9.18 1
Storebrand Norge A 41 19.11 -1.04 4.70 1
Storebrand Norge I 176 5.31 -0.62 5.52 1
Storebrand Norge Institusjon 168 4.23 -0.58 4.92 1
Storebrand Optima Norge 37 6.22 0.00 2.29 0
Storebrand Vekst 267 11.65 0.70 6.98 1
Storebrand Verdi 204 7.76 0.44 5.82 1
Swedbank Generator 51 12.79 0.28 2.91 0
Terra Norge 185 5.09 0.22 4.02 1
Terra Vekst 41 -14.11 0.16 2.60 0
VÅR Aksjefond 37 0.38 0.09 3.16 0
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Table F.I
Individual Mutual Fund Characteristics (1/2)
The table shows individual fund characteristics on all Norwegian funds in our mutual fund
database. Columns 1 - 6 report alpha, alpha t-statistic, and individual factor loadings on the
risk factors used in the unconditional four-factor model of Carhart (1997), MKT, SMB, HML
and PR1YR, respectively. Column 7 reports the R-squared. The estimates are constructed by
running regressions on each individual fund from 1983 to 2014. Alphas are reported in percent
per year.
Name α tαˆ βMKT βSMB βHML βPR1Y R R2
ABIF Norge ++ 0.14 0.05 1.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 0.95
Alfred Berg Aksjefond Norge -4.31 -2.52 1.00 0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.95
Alfred Berg Aksjespar -6.20 -2.61 1.07 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.92
Alfred Berg Aktiv -1.58 -0.77 1.15 0.29 -0.19 0.00 0.88
Alfred Berg Aktiv II -2.95 -1.16 1.09 0.30 -0.18 -0.04 0.87
Alfred Berg Gambak -0.85 -0.37 1.17 0.44 -0.32 0.05 0.84
Alfred Berg Humanfond -1.08 -0.67 1.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.09 0.93
Alfred Berg N. Pensjon 0.51 0.38 1.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.95
Alfred Berg Norge Classic -1.26 -1.08 1.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.94
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk -0.52 -0.30 1.05 0.02 -0.14 -0.15 0.95
Alfred Berg Norge Inst 1.86 1.37 1.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.95
Alfred Berg Norge + -2.53 -0.77 1.07 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.93
Alfred Berg Vekst -7.68 -1.29 1.14 0.29 -0.11 0.18 0.79
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class A -2.98 -1.01 1.06 0.19 -0.16 0.27 0.86
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class B -2.47 -0.85 1.05 0.19 -0.16 0.27 0.88
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class D -3.59 -0.79 0.90 0.06 -0.12 0.40 0.83
Arctic Norwegian Equities Class I -2.53 -0.87 1.05 0.19 -0.16 0.27 0.88
Atlas Norge -0.89 -0.36 1.13 0.17 -0.31 -0.02 0.87
Banco Norge -3.64 -0.85 1.09 0.18 -0.27 -0.19 0.96
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1.45 0.86 0.99 -0.03 -0.16 0.08 0.90
Danske Invest Aktiv Formuesforvaltning A -8.81 -0.97 0.76 0.07 0.19 0.30 0.84
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 1 5.03 3.03 0.96 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 0.93
Danske Invest Norge Aksj. Inst 2 6.58 2.70 0.98 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.92
Danske Invest Norge I 1.39 0.88 1.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.13 0.90
Danske Invest Norge II 0.85 0.55 1.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.13 0.91
Danske Invest Norge Vekst -1.45 -0.54 1.08 0.43 -0.27 0.01 0.77
Delphi Norge 1.12 0.49 1.18 0.32 -0.23 -0.06 0.85
Delphi Vekst -1.79 -0.64 1.10 0.35 -0.29 -0.09 0.84
DNB Norge -0.47 -0.50 1.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.97
DNB Norge (Avanse I) -1.39 -1.20 0.98 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.94
DNB Norge (Avanse II) -0.61 -0.46 0.93 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.89
DNB Norge (I) -1.44 -1.38 0.98 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.95
DNB Norge (III) -0.45 -0.49 1.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.97
DNB Norge (IV) 0.99 0.86 1.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.97
DNB Norge Selektiv 2.05 1.33 1.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 0.93
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 0.39 0.32 1.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.97
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) -0.54 -0.42 1.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.94
DnB Real-Vekst -3.42 -2.41 0.97 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.95
DNB SMB 0.20 0.07 1.26 0.58 -0.16 -0.23 0.85
Eika Norge 1.68 0.67 1.05 0.17 -0.05 -0.15 0.88
Eika SMB -0.82 -0.34 0.98 0.17 -0.03 -0.21 0.86
Fokus Barnespar -13.29 -1.29 0.99 0.04 0.01 -0.24 0.87
Fondsfinans Aktiv II -3.80 -0.88 0.95 -0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.91
Fondsfinans Norge 4.07 1.85 1.02 0.08 -0.11 -0.16 0.90
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Table F.II
Individual Mutual Fund Characteristics (2/2)
Name α tαˆ βMKT βSMB βHML βPR1Y R R2
FORTE Norge -5.95 -1.41 1.09 -0.07 -0.16 0.07 0.83
FORTE Trønder 4.35 0.48 0.57 -0.19 -0.22 0.12 0.52
GAMBAK Oppkjøp -6.43 -0.60 0.58 0.04 -0.35 0.37 0.90
GJENSIDIGE AksjeSpar -4.14 -2.17 0.95 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.92
GJENSIDIGE Invest -5.30 -2.65 0.99 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.93
Globus Aktiv -5.44 -1.03 1.08 0.08 -0.26 -0.41 0.79
Globus Norge -7.06 -1.52 1.07 0.15 -0.26 -0.39 0.81
Globus Norge II -7.72 -1.52 1.07 0.10 -0.27 -0.42 0.78
Handelsbanken Norge 0.64 0.38 1.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.90
Holberg Norge 3.02 0.53 0.99 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.91
K-IPA Aksjefond 0.58 0.25 1.01 0.25 -0.10 -0.16 0.86
KLP Aksjeinvest -1.41 -0.54 0.94 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.89
KLP AksjeNorge 1.31 0.78 1.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.92
Landkreditt Norge 4.90 1.80 0.97 0.08 0.02 -0.16 0.88
Landkreditt Utbytte -1.68 -0.18 0.66 0.05 0.18 0.17 0.50
NB-Aksjefond -1.72 -1.03 1.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.14 0.92
Nordea Avkastning -1.66 -1.14 0.99 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.89
Nordea Barnespar -6.71 -1.93 0.97 0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.93
Nordea Kapital 2.05 1.48 1.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 0.93
Nordea Kapital II -2.72 -1.15 1.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.10 0.94
Nordea Kapital III -2.71 -0.98 1.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.16 0.94
Nordea Norge Pluss -1.19 -0.36 1.08 0.02 -0.15 0.07 0.89
Nordea Norge Verdi 1.60 0.92 0.95 0.16 -0.04 -0.13 0.88
Nordea SMB -7.84 -3.20 1.10 0.48 -0.08 -0.12 0.83
Nordea SMB II -19.32 -3.19 1.04 0.53 -0.13 -0.08 0.79
Nordea Vekst -1.69 -1.22 1.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 0.89
ODIN Norge 1.30 0.57 1.02 0.30 0.06 -0.11 0.80
ODIN Norge II -4.11 -1.36 0.97 0.31 -0.04 -0.07 0.80
Orkla Finans 30 -0.94 -0.48 1.04 0.10 -0.05 -0.07 0.91
Pareto Aksje Norge 1.98 0.88 0.97 0.20 0.00 -0.04 0.86
Pareto Aktiv -1.39 -0.59 0.95 0.21 -0.05 -0.02 0.85
Pareto Investment Fund A 0.79 0.49 1.00 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.87
Pareto Verdi 1.10 0.62 0.99 0.00 -0.05 -0.10 0.90
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforvaltning) 0.82 0.32 0.95 0.22 -0.08 -0.17 0.87
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforvaltning) 2.98 2.37 0.95 -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.94
Postbanken Aksjevekst -2.84 -1.12 1.02 0.02 -0.18 -0.08 0.92
RF Aksjefond -1.09 -0.52 0.95 0.00 -0.06 -0.11 0.92
RF Plussfond -6.34 -1.28 1.11 0.17 -0.29 -0.21 0.88
SEB Norge LU -0.01 0.00 1.09 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.94
Skandia Horisont 4.75 1.50 1.04 0.18 -0.11 0.03 0.86
Skandia SMB Norge -14.25 -3.59 1.03 0.40 -0.14 -0.10 0.81
Storebrand Aksje Innland -2.61 -2.37 1.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.96
Storebrand AksjeSpar -1.34 -0.71 0.95 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.88
Storebrand Norge 0.31 0.19 0.99 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.86
Storebrand Norge A -3.12 -0.76 1.06 -0.16 -0.06 -0.22 0.94
Storebrand Norge I -0.93 -0.59 1.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 0.94
Storebrand Norge Institusjon -0.27 -0.14 1.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.13 0.92
Storebrand Optima Norge -2.09 -0.97 1.08 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.96
Storebrand Vekst 0.33 0.11 1.07 0.29 -0.43 -0.06 0.75
Storebrand Verdi 2.05 1.52 0.99 -0.06 0.12 0.02 0.94
Swedbank Generator 1.35 0.30 1.25 0.13 -0.20 0.05 0.82
Terra Norge -0.84 -0.44 1.06 0.10 -0.16 -0.09 0.92
Terra Vekst -10.36 -1.26 1.01 0.31 -0.41 0.20 0.84
VÅR Aksjefond 1.74 0.36 1.09 0.06 0.19 0.04 0.94
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Table G.I
Sensitivity Analysis
Panel A (B) of this table shows the results of the cross-sectional bootstrap of Norwegian mutual
fund performance when the sample is restricted to only include funds that have at least 36
(24) monthly net return observations during the sample period from 1983 to 2014. Panel C
reports the results for the full sample. The first row in each panel reports the actual (estimated)
t-statistics of alpha for various points and percentiles of the performance distribution, ranging
from worst fund (bottom) to best fund (top). The second row reports the associated alpha
(annualized) for these t-statistics. Row 3 reports the bootstrapped p-values of the t-statistics of
alpha based on 10,000 bootstrap resamples. Funds are ranked according to their unconditional
Carhart (1997) four-factor t-statistic of alpha from the model as follows:
ri,t − rf,t = αi + β1i ·MKTt + β2i · SMBt + β3i ·HMLt + β4i · PR1Y Rt + εi,t
Panel A: 36 ≥ Observations
Bottom
Fund 2
nd 3rd Bottom5%
Bottom
10%
Top
10%
Top
5% 3
rd 2rd TopFund
t-alpha -3.59 -3.20 -3.19 -2.61 -2.17 1.37 1.80 2.37 2.70 3.03
Alpha -14.25 -7.84 -19.32 -6.20 -4.32 1.86 4.90 3.98 6.58 5.03
p-tstat 0.026 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.303 0.249 0.063 0.053 0.136
Panel B: 24 ≥ Observations
Bottom
Fund 2
nd 3rd Bottom5%
Bottom
10%
Top
10%
Top
5% 3
rd 2nd TopFund
t-alpha -3.59 -3.20 -3.19 -2.61 -2.17 1.37 1.80 2.37 2.70 3.03
Alpha -14.25 -7.84 -19.32 -6.20 -4.32 1.86 4.90 3.98 6.58 5.03
p-tstat 0.026 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.306 0.255 0.071 0.057 0.140
Panel C: Full Sample
Bottom
Fund 2
nd 3rd Bottom5%
Bottom
10%
Top
10%
Top
5% 3
rd 2nd TopFund
t-alpha -3.59 -3.20 -3.19 -2.61 -1.93 1.33 1.80 2.37 2.70 3.03
Alpha -14.25 -7.84 -19.32 -6.20 -6.71 2.05 4.90 3.98 6.58 5.03
p-tstat 0.036 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.261 0.091 0.075 0.175
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Figure H.1. Actual (estimated) t-statistics of alpha vs. bootstrapped t-statistics
of alpha distributions for individual funds using the conditional four-factor model.
This figure plots kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped conditional four-factor t-statistic of
alpha distribution (solid line) for various percentile points in the cross-section. The x-axis shows
the t-statistic of alpha (performance measure) and the y-axis the kernel density estimate. The
vertical dotted line shows the actual (estimated) fund t-statistic of alpha. Panel A1-A3 (B1-B3)
show marginal funds in the right (left) tail of the performance distribution. For example, “Top
5%” in Panel A2, refers to the marginal alpha t-statistic at the top 5 percentile of the performance
distribution. The bootstrapped distributions of t-statistics of alpha (under H0 : tˆαˆ = 0) is based
on 10,000 bootstrap resamples. Funds are ranked on their conditional four-factor t-statistic of
alpha, where the highest ranked fund has the highest t-statistic over the sample period.
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Appendix I
This appendix describes the maximum likelihood derivation of the coefficients in the
Markov regime-switching model following Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) and
Kosowski (2011). We start by denoting the mixture density of ri,t in the model as
φ(ri,t|Ωt−1; θ). ri,t is conditional on Ωt−1, where Ωt−1 represents an information set of
the respective variables Xt−1, rt−1, and zt−1 in addition to lagged values of these vari-
ables, i.e. Ωt−1 = {Xt−1, rt−1, zt−1,Ωt−2}. Further, the respective state density functions
is conditional on the state, i.e. η(rt|Ωt−1;St = j; θ). By using the respective state proba-
bilities as weights, and letting θ represent a vector of parameters in the likelihood function
of the data, the mixture density can be obtained as follows:
φ(ri,t|Ωt−1; θ) =
k∑
j=1
η(rt|Ωt−1;St = j; θ)Pr(St = j|Ωt−1; θ) (I1)
where Pr(St = j|Ωt−1; θ) is the conditional probability of being in state j at time t, given
the available information at time t − 1. Under assumptions about the state densities of
the innovations, t, and a law specifying how the state evolves over time, the parameters
of this model can be obtained by maximum likelihood estimation. The remainder of this
appendix describes in detail the specifications in arriving at the final maximum likelihood.
For now, let us decompose the log-likelihood (LL) function as follows:
LL(rT , rT−1, · · · , r1; θ) (I2)
We assume that the state densities, η(rt|Ωt−1;St = j; θ), are Gaussian (i.e. follows a
continuous probability distribution). Within each state, we enter (linearly) the variable
depending on the performance measure (Xt) in the excess return equation. However, we
allow the coefficients to vary between states for j = 1, · · · , k so that:
η(rt|Ωt−1;St = j; θ) = 1√2piσj exp
−(rt − αj − β ′jXt)2
2σ2j
(I3)
That is, we estimate the likelihood by weighting across the states by multiplying the
likelihood with the probability of the respective state. Since mixtures of normal can be
approximate a very broad set of density families, this assumption is not very restrictive.
Following the law of total probability, the conditional state probabilities can be obtained
recursively:
Pr(St = i|Ωt−1; θ) =
k∑
j=1
Pr(St = i|St−1 = j,Ωt−1; θ)Pr(St−1 = j|Ωt−1; θ) (I4)
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According to Bayes’ rule, the conditional state probabilities can then be derived as follows:
Pr(St−1 = j|Ωt−1; θ) = Pr(St−1 = j|rt−1, Xt−1, zt−1,Ωt−2; θ) = (I5)
η(rt−1|St−1 = j,Xt−1, zt−1,Ωt−2; θ) Pr(St−1 = j|Xt−1, zt−1,Ωt−1; θ)∑k
j=1 η(rt−1|St−1 = j,Xt−1, zt−1,Ωt−2; θ) Pr(St−1 = j|Xt−1, zt−1,Ωt−2; θ)
Equations I4 and I5 can be iterated to derive the state probabilities Pr(St|Ωt−1; θ) by
using recursive estimation, and the parameters of the likelihood function can finally be
obtained.
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Appendix J
Table J.I
Regime-Switching Estimates of Fama-French’s (1993) Three-Factor Alpha
This table reports regime-switching estimates of fund performance based on Fama and French’s
(1993) three-factor model. The table includes estimates when regime-switching is applied on
two-state models using both fixed transition probabilities (Model I) and time-varying transition
probabilities (Model II). Rows 1 to 5 report mean parameters, which includes alpha (in percent
per year) and the three risk factors in Fama and French’s model, MKT, SMB, and HML. Row
6 reports variance parameters in percent per month, and Rows 7 and 8 report the transition
probability parameters. Row 9 show the log-likelihood estimates of each three models. The
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each estimate. The sample period is 1983 to 2014.
The following regime-switching Fama-French (1993) three-factor model is estimated for the
equally-weighted portfolio of all funds:
ri,t − rf,t = αi,St + β1i,St ·MKT + β2i,St · SMBt + β3i,St ·HMLt + εi,t
where εt ∼ N(0, σst)
Column 1 reports single state estimates, whereas Columns 2 (Model I) and 3 (Model II)
report estimates in the two states. The transition probabilities in model I are fixed, and the
time-varying transition probabilities in Model II depend on the two month lagged change in
the Composite Leading Indicator ∆CLIt−2:
Model I: pt=Pr(St=1|St−1=1)=φ(c1), qt=Pr(St=2|St−1=2)=φ(c2)
Model II: pt=Pr(St=1|St−1=1)=φ(c1+pi1∆CLIt−2), qt=Pr(St=2|St−1=2)=φ(c2+pi2∆CLIt−2)
where φ(.) is the cumulative density function of a standard normal variable
Single State Model Model I Model II
Mean Parameters State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Alpha (in pct p.a.) -0.569 -1.352 0.292 -1.535 0.359
(-0.54) (-1.34) (0.53) (-1.61) (0.72)
MKT 0.997*** 1.001*** 0.979*** 1.001*** 0.980***
(66.41) (66.03) (15.68) (69.50) (15.78)
SMB 0.097*** 0.074*** 0.168** 0.077*** 0.156**
(4.54) (3.58) (2.07) (3.90) (2.24)
HML -0.049 -0.062*** -0.012 -0.063*** -0.009
(-2.81) (-3.79) (-0.15) (-3.95) (-0.12)
Variance Parameters
S.D. (in pct. p.m.) 1.683*** 1.174*** 2.954*** 1.175*** 2.960***
(113.04) (53.48) (28.14) (68.73) (31.47)
Transition Probability
Parameters
cs 3.142*** 1.595*** 3.287*** 1.672***
(5.29) (3.13) (5.81) (3.34)
ds∆(CLI)t−2 0.289 -0.049
(1.30) (-0.22)
Log Likelihood 1020.9 1061.6 1063.9
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Table J.II
Regime-Switching Estimates of Jensen’s (1968) Single-Factor Alpha
This table reports regime-switching estimates of fund performance based on Jensen’s (1968)
single-factor model. The table includes estimates when regime-switching is applied on two-state
models using both fixed transition probabilities (Model I) and time-varying transition probabili-
ties (Model II). Rows 1 to 5 report mean parameters, which includes alpha (in percent per year)
and the risk factor in Jensen’s model, MKT (i.e rM − rf ). Row 6 reports variance parameters in
percent per month, and Rows 7 and 8 report the transition probability parameters. Row 9 shows
the log-likelihood estimates of each three models. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses
below each estimate. The sample period is 1983 to 2014. The following regime-switching Jensen
(1968) single-factor model is estimated for the equally-weighted portfolio of all funds:
ri,t − rf,t = αi,St + β1i,St ·MKT + εi,t
where εt ∼ N(0, σst)
Column 1 reports single state estimates, whereas Columns 2 (Model I) and 3 (Model II)
report estimates in the two states. The transition probabilities in model I are fixed, and the
time-varying transition probabilities in Model II depend on the two month lagged change in
the Composite Leading Indicator ∆CLIt−2:
Model I: pt=Pr(St=1|St−1=1)=φ(c1), qt=Pr(St=2|St−1=2)=φ(c2)
Model II: pt=Pr(St=1|St−1=1)=φ(c1+pi1∆CLIt−2), qt=Pr(St=2|St−1=2)=φ(c2+pi2∆CLIt−2)
where φ(.) is the cumulative density function of a standard normal variable
Single State Model Model I Model II
Mean Parameters State 1 State 2 State 1 State 2
Alpha (in pct p.a.) 0.391 -0.066 0.474 -0.063 0.499
(0.28) (-0.63) (0.95) (-0.62) (0.93)
MKT 0.965*** 0.978*** 0.925*** 0.979*** 0.920***
(67.78) (66.53) (15.21) (66.26) (14.20)
Variance Parameters
S.D. (in pct. p.m.) 1.751*** 1.254*** 3.045*** 1.275*** 3.114***
(111.94) (57.48) (26.79) (58.90) (25.90)
Transition Probability
Parameters
cs 3.259*** 1.753*** 3.473*** 1.821***
(5.31) (3.20) (4.66) (3.01)
ds∆(CLI)t−2 0.164 -0.042
(0.53) (0.14)
Log Likelihood 1005.97 1042.3 1043.9
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